Tractable Combinatorial Auctions Via Graph Matching by Frank Guerin
Journal of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Research - (2007) p–p- Submitted 05/07; published -/-
Tractable Combinatorial Auctions Via Graph Matching
Frank Guerin fguerin@csd.abdn.ac.uk
Department of Computing Science, University of Aberdeen,
Aberdeen, AB24 3UE, Scotland
Abstract
Combinatorial auctions play a key role in distributed AI as a mechanism for eﬃciently
allocating resources or tasks, both for cooperative and competitive scenarios. The com-
plexity of the general problem has lead to interest in ﬁnding eﬃcient algorithms for useful
instances. Tennenholtz introduced an approach which ﬁnds polynomial solutions for cer-
tain classes of combinatorial auctions by a reduction to graph matching problems. This
paper looks at the possibilities and limits of this graph-matching approach. We extend
the set of known tractable combinatorial auctions identiﬁed by Tennenholtz to accommo-
date subadditive symmetric bids over bundles of unlimited size, certain restricted cases of
asymmetric discounts over bundles, and certain restricted cases of superadditive bids. We
provide results on the ultimate limits of the approach, identifying classes of auctions which
cannot be reduced to 2D graph matching, and classes which are NP-equivalent. We provide
complexity results for the solution of the identiﬁed classes of tractable auctions, using the
current best available graph matching algorithms.
c 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1. Introduction
Auctions are a ubiquitous market mechanism, allowing eﬃcient matching of buyers and
sellers. The rise of the Internet introduces new opportunities for their use. In many tra-
ditional markets, practical constraints have limited the extent to which auctions could be
deployed. For example without computer support it is not feasible to rapidly handle the
large volumes of information required for ﬁne grained bidding which can express valuations
over combinations of objects, nor is it feasible to cope with dynamic changes in price, nor to
calculate optimum allocations and pricing. In the absence of computer support, more rigid
pricing mechanisms have to be employed, leading to ineﬃcient allocations and ultimately
to wastage of resources. The Internet, and electronic technologies more generally, now have
the potential to facilitate ﬁne grained and eﬃcient dynamic pricing and allocation. Any
improvement in the eﬃciency of such a ubiquitous mechanism has the potential to bring
great beneﬁts to society; this explains the considerable amount of research eﬀort directed
to this end.
The auction is a very general idea, applying not only to the sale of goods, but also
to the allocation of resources (for example the allocation of computing resource in a grid
computing scenario) and the allocation of tasks (agents oﬀer to take on combinations of
tasks and to complete them to some stated speciﬁcation). Finding eﬃcient allocations is
equally important in cooperative and competitive scenarios. All of this underscores the key
role of auctions, and in particular combinatorial auctions, in distributed AI.
The desire to express combinatorial bids arises naturally in many scenarios. For ex-
ample, two consecutive advertising slots may be more valuable than two non-consecutive
slots; the consecutive slots would allow a diﬀerent class of advertisement to be run. A
bidder may be willing to pay more for the two consecutive slots than the sum of what he
would be willing to pay for each one independently. This increase in value occurs when
the combined objects complement one another; this is called “superadditive”. On the other
hand substitutable goods tend to have a decreasing value per unit as bundles of larger and
larger sizes are considered. In this case the value of combined bundles is less than the sum
of the individual objects’ values; this is called “subadditive”. Sometimes subadditive bids
will be expressed by sending the auctioneer a function describing a downward curve (price
per unit as a function of number of units). More complex interactions are also possible, for
example buying more and more chunks of radio spectrum may lead to diminishing returns,
but to be allocated the whole lot might be extremely valuable as it excludes competitors.
Combinatorial bidding allows bidders to precisely express their valuations; however, the
downside is the computational complexity, both of the bidding languages and the allocation
problem. A fully expressive bidding language will allow an agent to express a valuation
for every possible combination of a set of objects. The size of such bids obviously grows
exponentially with the size of the set. Likewise the allocation problem quickly becomes
computationally diﬃcult. The allocation problem is commonly known as the CAP (com-
binatorial auction problem); it is in general NP-hard, and has been shown to be NP-hard
even for very restricted cases such as bundles of size ≤ 3 (Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad
(1998) show that a special case of such an auction is an instance of maximal 3-set packing).
These severe computational diﬃculties look set to continue to provide researchers in this
area with a steady stream of research challenges for some time.
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Nisan (2000) introduced the following three-way classiﬁcation for current work on allo-
cation algorithms for combinatorial auctions:
1. Polynomial instances of the CAP: ﬁnding computationally tractable special cases via
restricted classes of bids, for example Rothkopf et al. (1998), Sandholm and Suri
(2001), Conitzer, Derryberry, and Sandholm (2004).
2. Clever search algorithms for the full CAP, for example Sandholm, Suri, Gilpin, and
Levine (2001). A common tactic is to exploit the fact that bidding tends to be sparse
in practice.
3. Approximation algorithms for the full CAP: heuristic-based algorithms giving almost
optimal allocations in polynomial time, for example Dang and Jennings (2003), Saku-
rai, Yokoo, and Kamei (2000).
This paper belongs to the ﬁrst category. Tennenholtz (2000, 2002) introduced an approach
which ﬁnds polynomial solutions for certain classes of combinatorial auctions by a reduction
to graph matching problems. Using this approach he has identiﬁed new classes of tractable
combinatorial auctions, and shown how they can be solved eﬃciently using b-matching
techniques. We explore this approach further to ﬁnd the possibilities and limits; we ﬁnd
new tractable instances and new ways to solve them using simpler weighted graph matching
techniques in place of b-matching. This paper makes four contributions:
1. It extends the set of known “tractable combinatorial auctions” identiﬁed by Tennen-
holtz (2002); in particular, to accommodate bundles of unlimited size, certain re-
stricted cases of asymmetric discounts over sub-bundles, and certain restricted cases
of superadditive bids.
2. It provides results on the limits of these graph matching approaches to representing
auctions; i.e. it locates the boundary which divides the classes of auctions which can
and cannot be solved with the graph matching techniques under consideration.
3. In addition to extending the set of known tractable auctions, it also closes the gap
“from the other side”, expanding the set of known NP-equivalent auctions. In between
the tractable and NP-equivalent, the paper outlines the “unknown” region, which we
have proven cannot be solved by our matching techniques, and for which we do not
know any tractable solution method, but which have not been proven to be NP-
equivalent.
4. It provides complexity results for solving the identiﬁed classes, by using the current
most eﬃcient graph matching techniques available.
We can summarise the results by saying that graph matching techniques are an ex-
cellent way to handle many subadditive combinatorial auctions, but are quite limited for
superadditive auctions. Most of these superadditive cases are shown to be NP-hard, and
graph matching seems to take us quite close to the boundary of known NP-hardness, with
the unknown region in between being relatively small. It is hoped that these results will
provide researchers in the area with valuable knowledge of the types of auction that graph
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matching approach are good for, and how proposed auctions might be constrained so as
to be eﬃciently solvable by matching techniques. The results may also contribute to gen-
eral combinatorial auction solvers (such as described by Sandholm (2002)), where general
bids are accepted, but the solver recognises special cases that can be handled by known
polynomial algorithms.
Throughout the paper we will aim to make topics accessible to the general AI reader
who may have limited familiarity with graph theory. We will not follow the graph theory
conventions of m for number of edges and n for number of vertices, preferring E and V . To
minimise clutter we will omit the vertical bars to denote the size of a set where it is obvious
that size is being referred to; e.g. for a complexity which is linear in the set of edges E we
will use the notation O(E) in place of O(|E|).
Section 2 gives some preliminary material on combinatorial auctions and graph match-
ing. Section 3 is the longest section, it gives graphical structures for a wide variety of
bids, and gives results on the type of bids which graph matching cannot handle. Section 4
provides additional results on the types of bids which lead to NP-equivalent auctions, and
displays these results along with Section 3’s results in graphical form. Section 5 gives com-
plexity results for solving the identiﬁed classes, by using the current most eﬃcient graph
matching techniques available. Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
This section describes the standard combinatorial auction problem, and the variant of it
which we will be tackling. It then roughly describes how an optimal allocation can be
computed by a reduction to graph matching, and surveys the main results in the relevant
literature on 2D-graph matching algorithms.
2.1 Combinatorial Auctions
In a combinatorial auction the auctioneer is selling a set O = {o1,o2,...,om} of m ob-
jects to n potential buyers. A bundle of objects B is any subset of the objects, for
example B = {o5,o8,o9}. A bid is a pair (B,p) in which B is a bundle of objects
and p is the valuation (or price oﬀer) for the objects in B. Given a set B of k bids,
B = {(B1,p1),(B2,p2),...,(Bk,pk)} the combinatorial auction problem (CAP) is to ﬁnd
a set of bids which do not overlap, and which make the most money. Or, formally, to ﬁnd
a subset BM ⊆ B such that
P
(Bi,pi)∈BM pi is maximal, under the constraint that for all
(Bi,pi),(Bj,pj) ∈ BM : Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, meaning that the bundles in accepted bids can-
not overlap. The allocation problem in this auction is what the literature refers to as the
Combinatorial Auction Problem, or CAP. The assumption in this auction is that any non
overlapping bids can be accepted; this corresponds to the OR bidding language. There is
also an XOR bidding language where bidders may make mutually exclusive price oﬀers for
a number of bundles (i.e. “I will buy B1 or B2 but not both”). In such an auction each bid
is a set, {(B1,p1),(B2,p2),...,(Bk,pk)}, of bundles and price oﬀers, where only one can be
accepted. De Vries and Vohra (2003) call this the CAP2. This can be easily extended to the
OR-of-XORs language where a bidder combines a number of XOR oﬀers via an inclusive
OR (Sandholm, 2002). In this case no modiﬁcation is necessary to the CAP2 allocation
algorithm, since we can treat each OR-of-XOR bid as a set of XOR bids; the fact that they
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happen to be from the same bidder does not aﬀect the allocation. OR-of-XORs describes
the type of bidding in our graph based auctions. For most auctions we will assume that
some objects can be left unallocated at the end of the auction.
A superadditive combinatorial auction is one where for all disjoint bundles Bi,Bj ⊆ O,
an agent’s price oﬀer for Bi ∪ Bj is greater than or equal to the sum of his price oﬀers for
Bi and Bj. In superadditive auctions we will say that there is a surcharge on a bundle.
A subadditive combinatorial auction is one where for all disjoint bundles Bi,Bj ⊆ O, an
agent’s price oﬀer for Bi ∪ Bj is less than or equal to the sum of his price oﬀers for Bi and
Bj. In subadditive auctions we will say that there is a discount on a bundle. XOR bids are
relevant in subadditive auctions, but they are redundant in superadditive auctions, because
in a superadditive auction the auctioneer will not accept two disjoint bundles for a low price
if he can accept the combined bundle for a higher price.
2.2 2D-Graph Matching Algorithms for Auctions
In an auction we have some objects for sale, and some bids which are placed on them. We
can draw this as a diagram where we draw a point on the left for each bid and a point on
the right for each object. We connect each bid to the objects it is bidding on by drawing
lines; we can write the price oﬀered as an annotation on the line. This diagram can be
represented by a graph. A graph is a pair G = (V,E) where V is a set of vertices and E is a
set of edges. An edge is a set of two vertices (this a 2D graph). We will deal with weighted
graphs, where each edge is assigned an integer weight (representing the price oﬀer). We
use w(e) to denote the weight of the edge e. In a bipartite graph V can be divided in two:
V = V1 ∪V2 (often the vertices V1 are drawn on the left and V2 on the right), so that edges
can only go from an element of V1 to an element of V2. Many auctions can be solved by
representing them as a bipartite graph where bids are represented in V1 and the objects for
sale are represented in V2. We want to match objects up with the bids which are oﬀering
to pay the most. A matching M in a graph is a subset of E where no vertex of V is covered
(touched) by more than one edge e ∈ M (which can capture the requirement that no object
is sold to two diﬀerent bidders). In a bipartite graph it is easy to visualise a matching as
matching vertices on the left with those on the right. A vertex is called matched if it is
covered by the matching, otherwise it is exposed (representing an object that fails to sell, or
a bid that loses). A maximum weight matching is a matching which achieves the best value
for the sum of the weights of its edges. An optimal allocation in our auction graph is then
given by a maximum weight matching of the graph. In some auctions we will need to use
general (nonbipartite) graphs, for which the matching problem is slightly more complicated.
We will make use of the complexity bounds for the best known algorithms for the graph
matching problems we consider.
The problem of ﬁnding maximum matchings in graphs has a long history, resulting in
highly eﬃcient algorithms. The Kuhn-Munkres algorithm (Bondy & Murty, 1976, p. 87)
can compute a bipartite weighted matching in O(n3) time if the appropriate data structures
are used. An excellent explanation of the basic algorithm is given by Taha (1997, p. 195)
(this matching problem is known as “the assignment problem” in the Operations Research
literature). The Kuhn-Munkres algorithm, and other graph matching algorithms, work by
ﬁnding alternating paths. By alternating path we mean a path of even or odd length which
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alternates between matched and unmatched edges. A path is just a sequence of unique
vertices connected by edges. Clearly if one ﬁnds an odd alternating path where the two
ends are not matched, then one can ﬂip all the edges (matched becomes unmatched and
unmatched becomes matched) in the path and achieve a matching which has one more edge
than the previous (such a path is called an augmenting path). This process is repeated to
ﬁnd a maximal matching. Algorithms also work with the “dual” version of the problem,
which is to ﬁnd a minimum weight cover. A cover C assigns an integer value to each vertex
so that for any edge e = {u,v}, the sum of the cover of its two vertices is at least as large
as the weight of e; i.e. C(u) + C(v) ≥ w(e). A minimum weight cover is a cover which
achieves the smallest value for the sum of the covers of all vertices. The relationship between
minimum weight cover C and a maximum weight matching M is that for any edge e in M,
the sum of the cover of its two vertices is exactly the weight of e. It follows that the total
weight of all edges in a maximum weight matching will equal the total of the minimum
weight cover of all vertices in V .
The current best algorithm for calculating a maximum weight matching in a bipar-
tite graph is given by Gabow and Tarjan (1989). It makes use of scaling, and runs in
O(
√
V E log(V N)) time, where N is the heaviest edge in the graph. This gets close to
the O(
√
V E) bound of the well known Hopcroft-Karp algorithm for unweighted bipartite
maximum matching (Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, & Stein, 2001, p. 696). For cases where
weights are extremely small Gabow (1985) has sketched an O(
√
V E) algorithm for weighted
matching. Although this theoretically works for N = O(1), Gabow states that it is useful
in practice for N = 1 or 2. Kao, Lam, Sung, and Ting (2001) have more recently published
a decomposition algorithm for calculating a maximum weight bipartite matching, which
outperforms Gabow and Tarjan’s 1989 algorithm in the case of low weights; to be precise,
the case where W = o(E log(V N)) where W is the sum of the weights of all edges. Kao
et al.’s algorithm runs in O(
√
V W) time. If the average edge weight is A then W = AE,
and we can see that A would need to be very low for Kao et al.’s algorithm to be preferred.
Suppose N ≈ A and |V | = 210, then A should be ≤ 13. As we are interested in auctions
with ﬁne grained bidding, agents will need to use large integers (e.g. 106) to express their
bids, making Gabow and Tarjan’s algorithm preferred. However it should be pointed out
that Kao et al.’s algorithm is very elegant and simple to implement. It would be inter-
esting to see if scaling and decomposition could be combined to give a superior algorithm,
for example by successively decomposing edges whose weight is in the range [2blogNc,N].
However, this seems not possible, as to acquire the information about which edges can be
safely decomposed seems to require that the weighted matching algorithm be run on the
subgraph of heavier edges.
For the bipartite case, Feder and Motwani (1991) have introduced a technique which
can bring a speed up factor of log(V 2/E)/logV ; i.e. this factor takes a value in the
range [0,1] and this value can be multiplied by the time bound for a bipartite matching.
This factor has in fact been included in Kao et al.’s paper, and they quote their bound as
O(
√
V W log(V 2/E)/logV ). It is also applicable to Gabow and Tarjan’s algorithm. To get
a feel for the speed up it may help to write it as 2 −
logE
logV . One can see that as E gets
very large, approaching V 2 (i.e. a fully connected graph), the factor goes towards zero.
This is indeed a remarkable speed up for large highly connected graphs, and arouses some
curiosity. The idea behind it is that a large highly connected graph will necessarily contain
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large bipartite cliques; these can be compressed to increase eﬃciency, because ﬁnding a
maximum matching in a bipartite clique is trivial, and when this is part of a bigger graph,
any augmenting path can easily run through the clique, ﬂipping edges. Feder and Motwani’s
compressed graph retains all the vertices of the original, but removes all the edges in each
clique, and instead connects all these vertices to a new vertex which represents the clique.
Because of these new added vertices, the compressed graph is tripartite. They then use
Dinic’s ﬂow algorithm to ﬁnd the maximum matching. Note that the time for computing
the compression is negligible compared the time for computing the matching.
For maximum weight matching in general (nonbipartite) graphs the presence of blossoms
(subgraphs containing odd loops) makes matching more diﬃcult. Micali and Vazirani (1980)
have given an O(
√
V E) algorithm for the unweighted case. Gabow and Tarjan (1991) tackle
the weighted case using the technique of “shells” (introduced by Gabow) to tackle blossoms,
giving an O(
p
V α(E,V )logV E log(V N)) time algorithm; α is the inverse Ackermann
function which grows extremely slowly. For all practical purposes α(E,V ) ≤ 4, so we
could consider it as a constant, giving a bound O(
√
V logV E log(V N)) (the reality is only
slightly larger).
In the above matchings each vertex has either one or zero matched edges incident to it
(vertices at the ends of an edge are said to be incident to it, and vice versa); the weighted
degree-constrained subgraph problem (DCS) generalises this. The input to the DCS problem
is a multigraph (a graph where there can be multiple edges between any two vertices) where
every vertex in the graph is assigned an l-value and a u-value (lower, upper) describing the
minimum and maximum number of matched edges which can be incident to it in a DCS
solution. Gabow and Tarjan (1991) note that a DCS problem, where the input multigraph
has V vertices and E edges, can be reduced in linear time to a regular weighted matching
problem on a new graph with O(E) vertices and edges (the construction of the new graph is
given in Gabow (1985)). This gives a bound of O(
p
α(E,E)logE E3/2 log(EN)) for solving
the weighted DCS. Gabow and Tarjan (1991) also mention that this can be improved with
a careful implementation. This shows that DCS is merely a more concise way to represent
some graph matching problems; it gives us no extra power to represent problems than
normal graph matching. Tennenholtz (2002) reduces auctions to b-matching problems, a
special case of DCS. In a b-matching every vertex in the graph is assigned a b-value describing
the maximum number of matched edges which can be incident to it. There are two types
of vertices in Tennenholtz’s (2002) b-matching1, one has a ﬁxed number of matched edges
1. We note that “b-matching” has a number of diﬀerent meanings, and that there is a lack of consistency
in the literature when referring to diﬀerent variants, thus the term can be quite confusing. Cook, Cun-
ningham, Pulleyblank, and Schrijver (1998) describe “(b,u)-matching” (ibid. page 182) and “maximum
weight b-matching” (ibid. page 186), neither of which are the same as Tennenholtz’s version. In Cook
et al.’s “(b,u)-matching” the vertices must have exactly b incident edges and u’s are capacities deﬁned
on edges. Cook et al.’s “maximum weight b-matching” requires that the number of incident edges must
be ≤ b, but there is no lower limit. Gabow (1983) calls this the upper degree constrained subgraph
problem (UDCS). Jebara and Shchogolev (2006) use the same term as Cook et al., “maximum weight
b-matching”, to refer to a diﬀerent problem: a matching with the requirement that the number of in-
cident edges must be exactly b; this is the problem which Cook et al. (ibid. page 182) call “perfect
b-matching”. When M¨ uller-Hannemann and Schwartz (2000) refer to “weighted b-matching” they are
talking about the same problem, i.e. the number of incident edges must be exactly b and there are no
“capacities”. In general we can say that Tennenholtz’s use of the term “b-matching” is unusual in that it
refers to a problem with two distinct types of vertices; it is eﬀectively like a combination of Cook et al.’s
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b incident to it, and the other accepts any number of matched incident edges in the range
[0,b].
It is also worth pointing out that all of the time bounds above are worst cases, and
empirical evidence has shown that average case running times tend to be considerably
better. Bast, Mehlhorn, Sch¨ afer, and Tamaki (2004) have found average case results of
O(E logV ) for the Hopcroft-Karp (unweighted bipartite) and Micali-Vazirani (unweighted
nonbipartite) algorithms, whose worst case bounds were O(E
√
V ). Since the weighted
matching algorithms are based on these unweighted ones, similar speed ups can be expected.
Bast et al.’s results come from randomly generated sparse graphs.
All of the matching algorithms mentioned above are for what we call 2D-graphs, where
each edge connects exactly two vertices; hypergraphs generalise this, allowing an edge to
connect n vertices. When we subsequently talk about 2D-matching techniques we are re-
ferring to all those algorithms mentioned above: bipartite matching, nonbipartite matching
and the DCS.
3. Graphical Structures for Various Bids
This section shows how auctions with various diﬀerent types of bids can be represented with
graphs, and how the optimal allocations can be solved by using a graph matching algorithm.
In general each auction is represented by a weighted bipartite graph G = (V1∪V2,E) where
each bid is represented by a number of vertices in V1 and each object for sale is represented
by a single vertex in V2. The edges connecting bids to objects have a weight which is the
price oﬀered for that object. A singleton bid ({o},p) (which means a price oﬀer p for object
o) is represented by adding a single vertex to V1 to represent the bid, and an edge with
weight p connecting to the vertex of V2 which represents object o. The bidding here implies
an OR over all bids placed; i.e. one bidder can place a number of bids, and the auctioneer
interprets this as an OR over all those bids. The graph will not be fully connected with
E = V1 × V2 unless every bidder places a bid for every object; we are primarily interested
in situations where the graph is reasonably sparse, this seems to be the typical case in the
distributed AI scenarios which we are most interested in. For example, consider multi-agent
systems implementing eCommerce applications where a large range of objects are for sale,
and each agent is interested in a small subset of them. The optimal allocation can be
calculated by ﬁnding a maximum weight matching in G. If all bids are singletons this is a
simple matter of picking the largest bid placed on each object. We now describe a number
of diﬀerent types of nonsingleton bids which can all be combined in this type of auction.
In all the descriptions below we assume V2 has one vertex corresponding to each object for
sale. The additions to V1 for each bid type are described case by case. The earlier auctions
have been identiﬁed as tractable by Tennenholtz, we point out diﬀerences where they arise.
“maximum weight b-matching” and “perfect b-matching”. Penn and Tennenholtz (2000) generalise this
further and refer to “(general) b-matching”, allowing the lower limit on the number of incident edges to
be in the range [0,b] (whereas above it is only allowed to be either zero or b). Gabow (1983) calls this
the degree constrained subgraph problem (DCS).
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3.1 Bids for Multiple Objects with a Quantity Constraint
The quantity constrained bid is a bid which makes price oﬀers for a number (k) of objects,
but puts a limit (q < k) on the overall number which will be allocated. The price paid for
any bundle B which is eventually allocated (where |B| ≤ q objects) will be simply the sum
of the prices oﬀered on each object in B. Computing the optimal allocation is not trivial.
The seller cannot simply accept the largest bid on each object. Suppose a bidder i makes
an oﬀer pi for an object ox, which exceeds the price any other bidder oﬀers for that object;
it does not necessarily follow that ox will be allocated to bidder i. Suppose that the other
bidders make reasonable oﬀers for ox, but there is some other object oy for which they make
very poor oﬀers. Suppose further that i makes a good oﬀer for oy, then it may be optimal to
accept i’s oﬀer on oy and to reject his large oﬀer on ox. Computing the optimal allocation
is a non trivial combinatorial optimisation problem.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Quantity-constrained multi-object bid (QCMOB) is a subadditive combi-
natorial bid of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,...,ok,pk,q) where each pi is a price oﬀer for object
oi and q is the maximum number of objects to be assigned to this bid. This represents an
XOR over all
Pq
j=0
 k
j

possible selections of the k objects.
For each QCMO bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,...,ok,pk,q) we add q vertices to V1. Let us call the ver-
tices v1,v2,...,vq. For each of these vertices vi, we add k +1−i edges (vi,oi),(vi,oi+1)...
(vi,ok) to E, connecting to objects oi,oi+1,...,ok; their weights are pi,pi+1,...,pk respec-
tively. The maximum weight matching in this graph gives the optimal allocation. Since
each bid is represented by q vertices in V1, it can only be allocated a maximum of q objects.
Figure 1 illustrates a simple example. Notice that it is not necessary to connect each vi to
all k objects. By looking along the vertices v1,v2,...,vq one can see that the total number
of edges is k + (k − 1) + (k − 2) + ... + (k − q + 1). This is equal to the sum from 1 to k
minus the sum from 1 to (k − q), which gives
k(k+1)
2 −
(k−q)(k−q+1)
2 = kq − q
q+1
2 = O(kq),
because k ≥ q.
o1
o3
p2
o4
p1
p4
o2
p3
v1
v2
v3
Figure 1: A QCMO bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,o4,p4,3). Oﬀers are made for four objects but
a maximum of three can be allocated.
The reason for this auction being called subadditive is that the bidder is expressing that
his valuation for a bundle exceeding q objects is equal to his valuation for a subset of that
bundle which contains q objects; hence he is willing to pay nothing for the extra objects,
and his valuation on the larger bundle is less than his separate valuations on the bundle of
size q, and the extra objects. The way in which we have represented the bid would not allow
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the auctioneer to allocate extra objects to the bid (for free); if we want to allow this then we
can add k −q dummy vertices on the left which connect to each object o1,...,ok and have
weight zero. The use of maximum weight matchings would then give the following meaning
to the bid b = (...,q): the valuation for a bundle B with |B| > q is equal to the valuation
for the subset of B of size q for which b’s valuation is maximal. In fact we can also come
up with structures which give positive weight to these dummy links, meaning that speciﬁc
subsequent objects can be bought at some discount, if they are purchased in conjunction
with the other q. We will discuss the limitations of such structures further when we come
to asymmetric bids (Section 3.7).
For QCMO bids our formulation is equivalent to Tennenholtz’s, except that we use
weighted matching in place of b-matching; this allows us to use a simpler matching algo-
rithm. The b-matching formulation of many problems looks more concise, but as we have
seen in Section 2.2, the maximum weight DCS algorithm will expand out all the vertices
before running the normal graph matching algorithm. Penn and Tennenholtz (2000) have
also deﬁned the Partition-constrained multi-object auction (PCMOA) which is simply a col-
lection of QCMO bids for each bidder. Each bidder partitions the objects into a collection
of disjoint subsets, and places one QCMO bid on each subset.
3.2 Bids for Subadditive Pairs
A subadditive bid for a pair is simply a price oﬀer for each individual object in the pair,
along with a discounted valuation if the pair is to be allocated as a bundle.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A subadditive pair bid is a bid of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,disc) which repre-
sents an XOR over the following oﬀers: p1 is the price oﬀered for object o1, p2 is the price
oﬀered for object o2 and (p1 + p2 − disc) is the price oﬀered for the bundle {o1,o2}, where
0 ≤ disc ≤ min(p1,p2).
For each pair bid of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,disc), we add the following structure to our
graph: Add one vertex p to V1 which oﬀers each object at full price. This requires edges
(p,o1),(p,o2) to be added to E, with weights p1,p2 respectively. Add one vertex p−disc to
V1 which oﬀers the second object at a discounted price. This requires edge (p−disc,o2) to
be added to E, with weight p2 − disc. Figure 2 illustrates this.
o1
o2 p-disc
p
p1
p2
p2 - disc
Figure 2: A pair bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,disc). Oﬀers are made for two objects but there is a
discount disc if both are allocated. Objects o1 and o2 are represented on the
right, and disc is the discount for purchasing both together.
Since the maximum weight matching algorithm is trying to maximise total weight, it
will always pick the connection to p if a single object is allocated, hence guaranteeing the
full price for a single object. This formulation is again equivalent Tennenholtz’s, except for
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the use of weighted matching in place of b-matching. The constraint disc ≤ min(p1,p2)
is necessary to avoid having a negative weight edge to vertex p−disc (which would never
be matched). This seems a reasonable constraint for the auction, as to violate it would
eﬀectively mean that, having bought one object, the bidder would be paid to take the
second one away; on the other hand one could imagine a scenario where some negative
synergy exists between the objects (for example exceeding the threshold for some tax) such
that being allocated the second is a burden. Allowing the negative weight edge would allow
this bid to be expressed, but it is not really meaningful if the matching never takes it. To
make it meaningful we would have to have a “forced sale”. We remove the auctioneer’s free
disposal and force certain objects (i.e. all those for which a disc > min(p1,p2) bid has been
placed) to be allocated by setting their degree to be 1, and using a DCS in place of normal
matching.
We now explain an alternative equivalent structure to represent binary bids. This struc-
ture gives no advantages in the pair case; it has one extra edge, and one extra vertex. How-
ever, it will prove useful in the later auctions, and it is convenient to introduce it now on
this simple example. In this alternative structure, for each pair bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,disc), we
add one vertex d to V2 (this is known as a discount vertex) and add two vertices v1,v2 to
V1, and for each of v1,v2, add two edges, e.g. for v1 add (v1,o1),(v1,d) with weights p1,disc
respectively, to E. Figure 3 illustrates this.
o1
o2
d
v1
v2
p1
p2
disc
Figure 3: Alternative bipartite structure to model a pair bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,disc) (top). The
four lower diagrams indicate the matchings (heavy lines) corresponding to buying
(i) no objects; (ii) object o1; (iii) object o2; (iv) objects o1 and o2.
Now without any object being purchased this structure contributes a weight disc to
the overall maximum weight matching. Therefore we subtract disc from the ﬁnal value of
the matching. If both objects are purchased by this bid, then the disc edge will be lost,
giving the required discount to the bidder. We still need the constraint disc ≤ min(p1,p2)
as without it the cheaper object would never be allocated. The maximum weight matching
in a graph including these structures gives the optimal allocation. The price to be paid by
each bidder is given by the sum of the weight of all that bidder’s edges which are included
in the matching (i.e. all the matched edges of the structures corresponding to his bids),
minus the disc of each of his pair bids. The total value to the auctioneer is given by the
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value of the maximum weight matching minus the disc of each pair bid. Again we could
get over the constraint disc ≤ min(p1,p2) if we use a forced sale (using DCS).
3.3 Almost Additive Bids
Almost additive bids are another type of bid which Tennenholtz has handled, and which we
include for completeness. In this bid individual price oﬀers are placed on k objects. If < k
objects are allocated then the price paid is simply the sum of the individual prices. If the
whole k are allocated then there is a discount.
Deﬁnition 3.3 An almost additive bid is a bid of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,...,ok,pk,disc)
which represents an XOR over the following oﬀers: the price oﬀer for any strict subset
S ⊂ {o1,...,ok} is
P
oi∈S pi and the price oﬀer for the full set is (
Pk
i=1 pi) − disc. We
require that 0 ≤ disc ≤ pi for all i.
o1
o2
p
o3
disc
v1
v3
v2
v4
p - disc
p
p
p o4
o5 v5
o1
o2
o3
o4
o5
d
p1
p3
p2
p4
p5
Figure 4: An almost additive bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,...,ok,pk,disc) for k = 5. Oﬀers are made
for k objects but there is a discount disc if all k objects are allocated. The
“standard” structure is on the left and the “alternative” on the right. Edge
weights have not been included on the left, but they should be obvious by analogy
with the pair case (see Figure 3).
In Figure 4 we show both the “standard” and “alternative” structures which can represent
an almost additive bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,...,ok,pk,disc). We will forego a detailed description
as it should be obvious by extension of the pair structures (see previous section). In the
standard structure each object allocated will take the most expensive edge available, so the
discount vertex will only be matched if there is no other one available; i.e. if the whole
set is being allocated. In the alternative structure the d vertex will be matched as long as
fewer than k objects are being allocated, because it then has a free vi vertex to match; only
if the whole set is being allocated does it need to be broken. If no object is allocated the
alternative structure still generates revenue disc so this must be subtracted from the overall
revenue (similar to the pair case). Again our formulation is equivalent to Tennenholtz’s
except that weighted matching makes things considerably simpler than b-matching
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3.4 Bids for Subadditive Triples
The case of triples is where things really start to get interesting. We know that combina-
torial auctions with triples are in general NP-hard, but we will see that the special case of
subadditive symmetric triples is tractable.
Deﬁnition 3.4 A subadditive symmetric triple bid is a bid of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3) which represents an XOR over the following oﬀers: pi is the price
oﬀered for object oi, and (pi +pj −d2) is the price oﬀered for any pair bundle {oi,oj}, and
(p1 +p2 +p3 −d3) is the price oﬀered for the whole triple bundle {o1,o2,o3}. Given that we
are talking about subadditive bids, discounts d2,d3 must be positive.
(Read d2 as “discount for a pair” and d3 as “discount for a triple”.) Symmetric here (and
in all subsequent tuple bids) means that the discount for any subset of the tuple is the
same, e.g. in the triple case the discounts for {o1,o2} and {o1,o3} and {o2,o3} are all the
same. To handle subadditive symmetric triple bids we need to employ diﬀerent graphical
structures depending on the relative magnitudes of the discounts d2,d3.
3.4.1 The Case Where d3 ≥ 2d2
Theorem 1 Combinatorial auctions with subadditive symmetric triple bids of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3) where d3 ≥ 2d2 and pi > d3 −d2 (for all i) are tractable and can
be solved by bipartite matching.
o1
o2 p - d2
p
p - (d3 - d2) o3
Figure 5: A triple bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3). Oﬀers are made for three objects, at
three diﬀerent prices. The most expensive (p) will be taken if only one object is
allocated; if a second is allocated it cannot connect to p as it has been used up,
so it must connect to the cheaper p − d2; likewise the third will have to connect
to the even cheaper p−(d3 −d2). Edge weights have not been included, but they
should be obvious by analogy with the pair case (see Figure 3).
Proof. Again we will give both the standard and alternative structures to represent the
triple bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3). For the standard version we add three vertices to V1
(Figure 5 illustrates this): the ﬁrst vertex oﬀers each object at full price, the second vertex
oﬀers the second object i at the pair discount price pi −d2, the third oﬀers the third object
i at the triple discount price pi − (d3 − d2). Clearly we need the third oﬀer to be no more
attractive than the second (otherwise it would have been taken ﬁrst), therefore we need
pi − (d3 − d2) ≤ pi − d2 which gives us the constraint d3 ≥ 2d2. It can be seen that the
discount for the third object “gives back” the discount for the second; thus if all three are
allocated the total price is p1 +p2 +p3 −d2 −(d3 −d2) = (p1 +p2 +p3 −d3), as desired. 
Figure 6 shows the alternative version. If no object is allocated the structure still
generates revenue d2 + (d3 − d2) = d3 so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue
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(similar to the pair case). If a pair is allocated the cheaper link (d2) will be broken, leading
to the desired reduction in revenue. If all three are allocated both links will be broken, and
since there is an overall reduction of d3 in the revenue, the overall value will be correct. The
alternative version has ﬁve extra (beyond the objects) vertices where the standard version
has three. For general n-tuples the alternative version has 2n−1 vertices and
n(n+1)
2 +n−1
edges where the standard has n vertices and
n(n+1)
2 edges. In both cases there are O(n)
vertices and O(n2) edges. We will not use the standard version from now on, as we will see
the advantages of the alternative in the next section.
o1
o3
o2
d3 - d2
d2
p1
p3
p2
Figure 6: Alternative bipartite structure to model a triple bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3)
(top). The four lower diagrams indicate matchings (heavy lines) corresponding
to buying (i) {}; (ii) {o1}; (iii) {o1,o2}; (iv) {o1,o2,o3}.
Tennenholtz (2002) handles triple bids which satisfy the constraint d3 > 3d2. We have
relaxed this constraint and thus shown that a larger class is tractable; we will relax it further
in the next subsection.
3.4.2 The Case Where d2 ≤ d3 < 2d2
We encounter an interesting problem when we try to make the discount d3 less than twice
d2. Because the discount for a triple must include the pair discount as well, the “extra”
discount for the triple is d3 − d2, which starts to become less than d2 as d3 goes less than
2d2. This means that the matching algorithm will prefer to take the d3 − d2 discount ﬁrst.
We can view the matching algorithm as being the auctioneer who is trying to maximise
revenue. If a pair is to be allocated he will take the link giving the bigger revenue, i.e. the
link with discount d3−d2 (bigger revenue=smaller discount), which is not the valuation the
bidder has given for a pair. This leads us to wonder if there might be some clever bipartite
structure S which can represent the bidder’s valuation for a pair, and force the matching
algorithm to take the bigger discount ﬁrst. The following theorem will prove that there is
not. (Note that there follows a long sequence of lemmas and theorems, and the reader who is
15Guerin
more interested in possibilities than impossibilities could skip to Figure 8 and Theorem 6 at
this stage.) We work with the assumption that our bipartite structure S (which represents
a bid) would be connected by edges to the objects (in the main graph) on which the bid
is placing oﬀers (example S structures appear in all the preceding ﬁgures). Thus to ﬁnd
the value of the bid, we consider the maximum weight matching of the graph formed from
S and the vertices corresponding to whatever objects eventually get allocated to this bid.
We can view the allocation or non-allocation of an object to this bid as the inclusion or
removal of an object vertex in S. To handle the discount d3 < 2d2 we need a structure that
gives a bigger increase in value if an object ok is added to structure S + {oi,oj} than if it
is added to structure S + {oi}. We will show that this is impossible, and more generally it
is impossible for the increase in value, due to adding any object o after some others, to be
greater than if o were added before. We will eventually generalise to DCS over multigraphs
to show that even that does not help. We ﬁrst need a lemma due to Kao, Lam, Sung, and
Ting (2000).
Lemma 1 (Kao et al. (2000)) Let G = (V,E) be a weighted graph and let M be a max-
imum weight matching of the graph. For any vertex v ∈ V :
1. If v is not matched by M, then M is also a maximum weight matching of the graph
G − {v}.
2. If v is matched by M, then G contains a single alternating path P starting from v
which can transform M to a maximum weight matching of the graph G − {v}.
Proof. (following Kao et al. (2000)) Statement 1 is straightforward. For 2: let M−v be a
maximum weight matching of G−{v}. Now consider the symmetric diﬀerence M ∪M−v −
M ∩ M−v (all the edges in one but not the other), this must be a set A of vertex disjoint
alternating paths and cycles. One path must end on v, because v is matched in M and
not in M−v; call this path P. Now suppose we transformed the original matching M by
just P; we would have a matching M0
−v. We will now show that M0
−v must in fact be a
maximum weight matching; any other paths and cycles in A do not improve the value. The
other paths and cycles in A do not touch v, therefore they could just as well be applied to
change M; if they cause an increase in the value of the matching then M was not maximal
originally and we reach a contradiction. 
We can also show that this works backwards.
Lemma 2 Let G = (V,E) be a weighted graph. For any vertex v ∈ V , let M−v be a
maximum weight matching of the graph G − {v}: G contains a single alternating path P
starting from v which can transform M−v to a maximum weight matching of G.
(We don’t have two cases this time, because P could have length zero, corresponding to the
case where v remains unmatched in the maximum weight matching of G)
Proof. Firstly note that the proof does not immediately follow from Lemma 1. Let M
be a maximum weight matching of G. Lemma 1 tells us that there is an alternating path
P0 which can convert M to a maximum weight matching of G − {v}. However G − {v}
might have several maximum weight matchings; Lemma 1 only guarantees that at least one
of them can be transformed to M by P0. Given that M−v is one of the maximum weight
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matchings of G − {v} it is possible that it is one which cannot be extended to a maximum
weight matching of G by a single alternating path P starting at v. Suppose we have a non
extendible M−v; its symmetric diﬀerence from M is a set A of vertex disjoint alternating
paths and cycles. At most one path may end on v, that is if v is matched in M and not
in M−v; call this path P (if v is not matched in M then make P a dummy path of length
zero). Now suppose we transform M−v by just P; we would have a matching M0 which
must in fact be a maximum weight matching of G; any other paths and cycles in A do not
improve the value. The other paths and cycles in A do not touch v, therefore they could
just as well be applied to change M−v; if they cause an increase in value then M−v was
not a maximum weight matching of G − {v} and we reach a contradiction. Therefore any
maximum weight M−v must be extendible. 
Note that this works equally well for non-bipartite graphs; the proof did not make use of
the bipartite property of a graph. It also works for the DCS (degree constrained subgraph)
provided that the vertex being added has degree one (u = 1). We generalise it to handle
the other cases.
Lemma 3 Let G = (V,E) be a weighted multigraph. For any vertex v ∈ V , with upper
degree u, let M−v be a maximum weight DCS of the multigraph G − {v}: G contains at
most u alternating paths P1,...,Pu starting from v which can transform M−v to a maximum
weight DCS of G.
Proof sketch. (Similar to the previous cases) Add the edge connections one by one (fol-
lowing the routine used to add vertices above). The added alternating paths may interact,
but the diﬀerence between M−v and the ﬁnal DCS M must be a set of alternating paths
and cycles, and any paths or cycles which do not contact v could have been applied to
change M−v, so they must not cause any improvement. This leaves us with the paths which
contact v, of which there are at most u. 
We can generalise this further.
Lemma 4 Let G = (V,E) be a weighted multigraph. For any set of vertices v1 ...vk ∈
V , with upper degrees u1 ...uk, let M−v be a maximum weight DCS of the multigraph
G−{v1 ...vk}: G contains at most Σk
i=1ui alternating paths Pj, with at most ui alternating
paths starting from each vi, which can transform M−v to a maximum weight DCS of G.
Proof. Obvious, given the previous proofs. 
Now we present the main theorem. Essentially it states that adding o2 ﬁrst always leads
to a better increase than adding it after o1 (or at least an equal increase). Let mwm(G)
denote any maximum weight matching of G, and let w(mwm(G)) denote its weight.
Theorem 2 Given a bipartite graph G = (V1∪V2,E) and two new vertices o1 and o2 which
are to be added to V2 (along with any edge connections from {o1,o2} to V1):
w(mwm(G + {o2})) − w(mwm(G)) ≥ w(mwm(G + {o1,o2})) − w(mwm(G + {o1})).
Proof. Let P1 be the alternating path used to transform mwm(G) to mwm(G+{o1}). Let
P2 be the alternating path used to transform mwm(G+{o1}) to mwm(G+{o1,o2}). If P1
and P2 do not interact then we are done; P2 could just as well be applied to mwm(G) to
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give the exact same increase in value, so we have equality. Assume P1 and P2 do interact.
This interaction cannot be in the form of simply touching at a vertex; they must have
overlapping edges. To see this note that both are alternating paths, every vertex on the
path is matched (except possibly the last) if they touch at a vertex then two matched edges
are touching, which is not permitted. The possibility of the last vertex touching is open;
we have two cases: either the last vertices of both paths meet, or the last vertex of one
path meets the somewhere in middle of the other. An allowed meeting must mean that the
last edge on one path is unmatched. If the last edge ei of one path Pi meets the middle of
the other Pj, it must be that ei is an unmatched edge, but this means that the application
of Pi changed a previously matched edge at ei into an unmatched one. This would mean
that before the application of Pi, a matched edge was touching the middle of Pj which is
impossible (this case closed). Now we tackle the case where both ends meet. The bipartite
property of the graph means that when either path is taking an unmatched edge it is going
from V1 to V2 (recall that both paths start in V2). Now if both ends are to meet it must be
in V2 when both are ending with unmatched edges (if they met in V1 they would both be
matched). This means that P2 is not dependent on P1 having been applied ﬁrst, it could just
as well have been applied to change mwm(G) (this case closed). Now we have established
that the interaction takes the form of overlapping edges. P2 may join and leave P1 multiple
times, overlapping with some edges each time. However neither path crosses over itself (that
would not be a path, but would include a cycle; Lemma 2 guarantees no cycles). We will
deﬁne “upstream” to mean the a part of P1 which is closer to o1; “downstream” shall mean
farther from o1. Now let us consider the farthest downstream interaction (overlapping)
between P1 and P2. P2 must connect to P1 via a matched edge of P2; the next edge e of
P2 is an unmatched edge of P2 which inverts what had been a matched edge of P1, and
P2 must be travelling upstream (see example in Figure 7). Let e = {d,u} where d is the
o1 , start of P1
o2 , start of P2
end of P1
end of P2
d
u
upstream
downstream d΄
u΄
Figure 7: Interaction between alternating path P1 (black) and P2 (grey). P2 has not been
applied to the matching yet, but its path is shown.
downstream vertex and u is the upstream vertex. Now whatever P2 does after u causes a
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certain change in the value of the matching, call this ∆2. Let ∆1 be the change in the value
of the matching which had been brought about by the portion of P1 from u downstream
to the end of P1. ∆2 cannot exceed ∆1 because otherwise P1 would have not followed that
path (to maximise value), it would instead have followed P2 from u; note that this holds
true even if P2 subsequently overlaps with more sections of P1 further upstream; this would
correspond to P1 undoing some of what it had done, and if it leaves and rejoins it forms a
cycle (which has no value by Lemma 2). Having established that ∆2 cannot exceed ∆1, we
can see that if we want to apply P2 to change mwm(G), P2 could have done just as well or
better if it had followed P1 downstream instead of P2 from the vertex d. Note that the value
of P2 from d onwards is ∆2−w(e) whereas the value of P1 from d downstream is ∆1−w(e),
and ∆1 − w(e) ≥ ∆2 − w(e). Thus we have constructed a portion of an alternating path
which can be used to add o2 to G, and generate at least as much value as P2 does when
adding o2 to G + {o1}. Now strip away all of P2 from u onwards (i.e. invert its edges to
make things as they were before it was applied), then follow P1 upstream from u until the
next place where P2 joins into it (it may be that P2 overlaps P1 for a few edges before
leaving, and rejoining). Notice that this next overlapping must be an earlier (closer to o2)
portion of P2. Apply the same procedure again. Let e0 be the next overlapped edge, with
e0 = {d0,u0}. P2 travels on some path from u0 to d; clearly this portion of P2 cannot have
a greater value than the portion of P1 which goes from u0 to d (otherwise P1 should have
taken that to maximise). Therefore the portion of P1 which goes from u0 to d gives us a
portion of a path which could be taken to add o2 to G and obtain an increase in value at
least as good as that obtained when P2 is applied to mwm(G + {o1}). Clearly we can keep
continuing the procedure upstream along P1 until we reach the overlapping closest to o1.
Now we have a complete path which can be used to add o2 to G to obtain an increase in
value at least as good as that obtained when o2 is added to G + {o1} via P2 being applied
to mwm(G + {o1}). The complete path is: start at o2, follow P2 until the ﬁrst place where
it meets P1, then follow P1 downstream to its end. 
We now present a couple of generalisations of this. We could have presented the most
general theorem directly, but given the length of the above proof, it probably aids readability
to present things incrementally.
Theorem 3 Given a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2,E) and new set of vertices O1 and a
single vertex o2 which are to be added to V2 (along with any edge connections from O1∪{o2}
to V1): w(mwm(G+{o2}))−w(mwm(G)) ≥ w(mwm(G+ O1 ∪{o2}))−w(mwm(G+O1)).
Proof. By Lemma 3, mwm(G + O1) adds a set P1 of vertex disjoint alternating paths
to mwm(G); mwm(G + O1 ∪ {o2}) adds a further alternating path Pj on top of this.
Following the approach in the proof of Theorem 2, we can take each path Pi in P1 one by
one, and follow them from their downstream end upstream until they contact O1. We need
to be careful to take each path Pi in P1 in a particular order: we start with the last one
that was added (note that Lemma 3 tells us that adding a vertex later cannot be better
than adding it earlier, but it could be worse, so order is important). Now let Pi be the
last path of P1 that was added; we start following it upstream. Each time we come to
a vertex v where path Pj meets Pi, we then can say that the value increase which was
caused by the portion of Pi from v downstream is at least as good as what Pj gets after v.
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Otherwise Pi should have followed Pj from v instead; this is a feasible path for Pi because
Pi is the last path of P1 that was added, hence any subsequent interactions which Pj has
with P1 \ {Pi} could also have been performed by Pi; there are no subsequent downstream
crossings of Pi, nor any subsequent crossings of Pj (because Pj is a path, which is vertex
disjoint by deﬁnition). Now we strip away (invert edges) the portion of Pj from v onwards,
and continue scanning upstream along Pi until the next interaction. Thus we eventually
get to the furthest upstream interaction between Pi and Pj, let us say that the downstream
end of this overlapped portion is vertex d; we now know that by adding o2 to G, and using
Pj as far as d and following Pi downstream thereafter, we improve the value of w(mwm(G))
by at least as much as w(mwm(G + O1 ∪ {o2})) − w(mwm(G + O1)). We then progress
to the second last path Ph of P1 which had been added. Note that there are no further
interactions between Pj and Pi; we have stripped away all of these parts of Pj. Therefore
we can safely apply the same “tracing upstream procedure” on Ph; each time we meet an
interaction at a vertex u we know that the portion of Pj from u to d can only interact with
a further upstream part of Ph, or paths which were added before Ph (and hence which had
been available for Ph to interact with had it wanted to). We continue tracing upstream on
each path of P1, in reverse order of how they were added, until we end up at a vertex j
which is the ﬁrst place where Pj interacts with any path of P1; say this interaction is on
path Pa ∈ P1. We can now guarantee that by adding o2 to G, and using Pj as far as j
and following Pa downstream thereafter, we improve the value of w(mwm(G)) by at least
as much as w(mwm(G + O1 ∪ {o2})) − w(mwm(G + O1)). 
Let mwd(G) denote any maximum weight DCS of G, and let w(mwd(G)) denote its
weight.
Theorem 4 Given a bipartite multigraph G = (V1∪V2,E) and two new sets of vertices O1
and O2 which are to be added to V2 (along with any edge connections from O1 ∪ O2 to V1):
w(mwd(G + O2)) − w(mwd(G)) ≥ w(mwd(G + O1 ∪ O2)) − w(mwd(G + O1)).
Proof. (by induction on the size of O2) Theorem 3 gives us our base case, i.e. when
the size of O2 is one. For the inductive case we need to show that if
w(mwd(G + O2)) − w(mwd(G)) ≥ w(mwd(G + O1 ∪ O2)) − w(mwd(G + O1))
holds for O2 = On where On is some set of vertices of size n, then it will also hold for a
larger O2 = On ∪ {on+1} where on+1 is any extra vertex we add in. If we can prove this
then we know that it holds for any O2 because given any O2 we can simply build it up by
adding the vertices one by one. The assumption of our inductive step is
w(mwd(G + On)) − w(mwd(G)) ≥ w(mwd(G + O1 ∪ On)) − w(mwd(G + O1))
We want to show that this assumption implies that
w(mwd(G + On ∪ {on+1})) − w(mwd(G))
≥ w(mwd(G + O1 ∪ On ∪ {on+1})) − w(mwd(G + O1)) (3.1)
By Theorem 3 we have
w(mwd(G + {on+1})) − w(mwd(G))
≥ w(mwd(G + O1 ∪ {on+1})) − w(mwd(G + O1)) (3.2)
20Tractable Combinatorial Auctions via Graph Matching
and if we make a graph out of G + {on+1}, our assumption gives us
w(mwd((G + {on+1}) + On)) − w(mwd(G + {on+1}))
≥ w(mwd((G + {on+1}) + O1 ∪ On)) − w(mwd((G + {on+1}) + O1)) (3.3)
Note that w(mwd((G+{on+1})+O1)) must be the same as w(mwd(G+O1∪{on+1})). The
DCSs might not be the same, but their weights must be (otherwise one is not maximal).
Adding both sides of the inequalities 3.2 and 3.3 gives us what we want (inequality 3.1). 
Theorem 5 Assume that a combinatorial auction problem is represented by a bipartite
multigraph G = (V1 ∪ V2,E), and that the objects for sale are each represented by a vertex
in V2, and that bids are represented by any bipartite structures at all, and that the value of the
optimal allocation is proportional to the weight of a maximum weight DCS. Combinatorial
auctions with subadditive symmetric triple bids of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3) where
d2 ≤ d3 < 2d2 and pi > d3 − d2 (for all i) cannot be solved by ﬁnding a maximum weight
DCS of G.
Proof. If d3 < 2d2 then the gain in value for allocating object oi as the second of a pair
will be less than the gain in value if that same object is allocated as the third of a triple.
The allocation of an object entails an increase in value, hence some edges must be added
to connect to the object. To correctly model our auction we require that the connection of
the object as the second of a pair must bring less gain in value than if that same object is
connected as the third of a triple (i.e. after another one has been connected). Theorem 4
shows that this is not possible. 
The Theorem does not rule out the possibility that bipartite graphs might handle the
problem if each object were represented by vertices in both V1 and V2. This would allow
direct interaction between two bids. However it is not clear how the structure would be
arranged so that an object is either fully allocated or not, and a partially allocated ob-
ject would not correspond to a feasible allocation in the auction the graph is supposed to
represent. More outlandish schemes might also be possible, for example if the value of an
allocation were not proportional to the weight of a maximum weight DCS, but instead rep-
resented by some particular relationship among edges in a maximum weight DCS. Thus we
cannot claim that it is impossible to solve the auction as a DCS for any encoding scheme.
Note that the bipartite property of the graph was used in the ﬁrst part of the proof of
Theorem 2. If we move to nonbipartite graphs we open one little hole in the proof, and this
hole can be exploited to handle triple bids with d3 < 2d2. The hole which is opened is the
case where both ends of the alternating paths for o1 and o2 meet. Figure 8 illustrates the
appropriate structure. There is a single nonbipartite link with weight d2 which gives back
the pair discount if the triple is allocated.
Theorem 6 Combinatorial auctions with subadditive symmetric triple bids of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3) where d3 ≥ d2 and pi > d3 (for all i) are tractable and can be
solved by nonbipartite matching.
Proof. See Figure 8. Note that if no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue
d2 + d3 so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue (similar to the pair case). 
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o1
o3
o2
d2 d2
d3
p1
p3
p2
Figure 8: Nonbipartite structure to model a triple bid (o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,d2,d3) (top). The
four lower diagrams indicate matchings (heavy lines) corresponding to buying
(i) {}; (ii) {o1}; (iii) {o1,o2}; (iv) {o1,o2,o3}.
Note that the condition pi > d3 is actually no more restrictive than the condition
pi > d3 − d2 in Theorem 1, because Theorem 1 also had the condition d3 ≥ 2d2, whereas
now we have d3 ≥ d2. If we want very small pi values, the smallest we can make them is d2
in both cases.
Corollary 1 Given a nonbipartite multigraph G = (V1∪V2,E) and two new sets of vertices
O1 and O2 which are to be added to V2 (along with any edge connections from O1 ∪ O2 to
V1): The only way to achieve w(mwd(G + O2)) − w(mwd(G)) < w(mwd(G + O1 ∪ O2)) −
w(mwd(G+O1)) is if some of the ends of the paths added due to O2 touch some of the ends
of the paths added due to O1.
Proof. It can be seen from the proofs of Theorems 2 to 4 that the bipartite property was
used only once (in Theorem 2) and that was to guarantee that paths cannot gain advantage
by meeting end to end; the remainder of all proofs work for the nonbipartite case. 
Note also that the use of DCSs does not help at all; therefore in future proofs we will not
constantly refer to DCSs, but simply prove some limitations for graph matching, knowing
that they also apply to DCSs.
3.4.3 The Case Where d3 < d2
This case is actually superadditive because the valuation on a pair plus the valuation on
the excluded singleton is less than the valuation on the triple. We will see when we come
to superadditive bids that we cannot handle this case with our matching techniques.
22Tractable Combinatorial Auctions via Graph Matching
3.5 Bids for Subadditive Quadruples
Tennenholtz (2000) mentions the possibility of extending his technique to bundles of larger
size, but says “The conditions ...become more elaborated, which might make the results
less applicable.” By using our weighted matching structures in place of Tennenholtz’s b-
matching approach, we do not suﬀer the same constraints.
Deﬁnition 3.5 A subadditive symmetric quadruple bid is a bid of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,o4,p4,d2,d3,d4) which represents an XOR over the following oﬀers: pi
is the price oﬀered for object oi, and (pi +pj −d2) is the price oﬀered for any pair {oi,oj},
(pi+pj +pk−d3) is the price oﬀered for any triple {oi,oj,ok}, and (p1+p2+p3+p4−d4) is
the price oﬀered for the whole quadruple. Given that we are talking about subadditive bids,
discounts d2,d3,d4 must be positive.
Again, we need to employ diﬀerent graphical structures depending on the relative magni-
tudes of the discounts.
3.5.1 The Case Where d4 ≥ 2d3 − d2 and d3 ≥ 2d2
Theorem 7 Combinatorial auctions with subadditive symmetric quadruple bids of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,o4,p4,d2,d3,d4) where d4 ≥ 2d3−d2 and d3 ≥ 2d2 and pi > d4−d3 (for
all i) are tractable and can be solved by bipartite matching.
Proof. See Figure 9 (left). We know from Theorem 1 that we need d3 ≥ 2d2 to make sure
the third discount is not taken second. To make sure the fourth discount is not taken third
we also need d4 − d3 ≥ d3 − d2 which gives us d4 ≥ 2d3 − d2. Note that it would not be
safe to write the constraint as d4 ≥ 3d2 except in the case where d3 = 2d2. If no object is
allocated the structure still generates revenue d4 so this must be subtracted from the overall
revenue. 
o1
o3
o2
d3 - d2
d2
o4
d4 - d3
d2
d2 d3
o1
o3
o2
o4
d4
d3+ d2
p1
p3
p2
p4
p1
p3
p2
p4
d2
d3
o1
o3
o2
o4
d4
d3
p1
p3
p2
p4
Figure 9: Bipartite structure to model a quadruple bid (left). Nonbipartite structures to
model a quadruple bid (right and centre).
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3.5.2 The Case Where d3 ≥ d2 and d4 ≥ d3 + d2
Theorem 8 Combinatorial auctions with discounted symmetric quadruple bids of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,o4,p4,d2,d3,d4) where d3 ≥ d2 and d4 ≥ d3 + d2 and pi > d4 (for all i)
are tractable and can be solved by nonbipartite matching.
Proof. See Figure 9 (centre). If no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue
d2 + d3 + d4 so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue. 
Note that nonbipartite matching brings us a limited element of superadditivity here.
Let us make the discount for purchasing a third object (d3 − d2) and the discount for
purchasing a fourth object (d4 − d3) as small as possible; this happens when d3 = d2 and
d4 = d3+d2 = 2d2. Now the third object is allocated at full price, as is the fourth. Consider
the value of any pair {oi,oj} and the remaining pair {ok,ol}; these values are pi+pj−d2 and
pk+pl−d2, totalling p1+p2+p3+p4−2d2. The value of the quadruple is p1+p2+p3+p4−d2.
Provided d2 > 0 this is superadditivity. However the limitation is that we can only use our
superadditivity once. In Figure 9 (centre) we have made our structure so that the increase
in value for allocating an object fourth cannot exceed the increase for allocating it third.
See that the discount for the third can be less than the second (i.e. d3 < 2d2 and the
discount on the third allocation is d3 − d2), but the discount for the fourth can be no less
than d3 − d2.
3.5.3 The Case Where d4 ≥ d3 > 2d2
We could alternatively have changed the structure as shown in Figure 9 (right). Then the
discount for the fourth could be less than the discount for the third (d3 ≤ d4 < 2d3, the
d4 < 2d3 is not a constraint on this structure, we are just describing what is possible),
but the third must be greater than the second (d3 > 2d2). This turns out not to be
superadditive, because the value of a quadruple does not exceed the value of a triple and
a singleton; however in an n-tuple, a reduced discount for the fourth of many could make
superadditivity. Note that there is always the limitation that we cannot have two small
discounts in sequence.
Theorem 9 Combinatorial auctions with discounted symmetric quadruple bids of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,o3,p3,o4,p4,d2,d3,d4) where d4 ≥ d3 > 2d2 and pi > d4 (for all i) are tractable
and can be solved by nonbipartite matching.
Proof. See Figure 9 (right). If no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue
d2 + d3 + d4 so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue. 
3.6 Bids for Subadditive n-Tuples
By now it is easy to see how the structures generalise to n-tuples.
Deﬁnition 3.6 A discounted symmetric n-tuple bid is a bid of the form
(o1,p1,...,on,pn,d2,...,dn) which represents an XOR over the following oﬀers: for any
bundle B ⊆ {o1,...,on}, (
P
oi∈B pi) − d|B| is the price oﬀered for B. Each singleton {oi}
must have oﬀer pi so we ﬁx d1 = 0. Discounts d2,...,dn must be positive.
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Theorem 10 Combinatorial auctions with discounted symmetric n-tuple bids of the form
(o1,p1,...,on,pn,d2,...,dn) where dj ≥ 2dj−1−dj−2 for all j = 3...n, and pi > dn−dn−1
(for all i) are tractable and can be solved by bipartite matching.
Proof. The appropriate structure is the extension of Figure 9 (left) to handle n objects.
If no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue dn so this must be subtracted
from the overall revenue. 
We can see now that that the almost additive bids of Section 3.3 are a special case where
d2 ...dn−1 are zero. Furthermore, we can generalise the above bids further so that QCMO
bids become a special case of them.
Deﬁnition 3.7 A quantity constrained discounted symmetric n-tuple bid is a bid of the form
(o1,p1,...,on,pn,q,d2,...,dq), with q ≤ n, which represents an XOR over the following
oﬀers: for any bundle B ⊆ {o1,...,on} with |B| ≤ q, (
P
oi∈B pi) − d|B| is the price oﬀered
for B. Each singleton {oi} must have oﬀer pi so we ﬁx d1 = 0. Discounts d2,...,dq must
be positive.
Theorem 11 Combinatorial auctions with quantity constrained discounted symmetric n-
tuple bids of the form (o1,p1,...,on,pn,q,d2,...,dq) where dj ≥ 2dj−1 − dj−2 for all j =
3...q, and pi > dq −dq−1 (for all i) are tractable and can be solved by bipartite matching.
Proof. The appropriate structure is built by ﬁrst treating it as a normal discounted sym-
metric n-tuple bid for the objects o1,...,oq, and constructing the structure as Theorem 10
would dictate. Then to handle the extra objects oq+1,...,on we must add edges just as
in the QCMO structure of Section 3.1; i.e. for each of the vertices vi ∈ V1 which be-
long to this bid, we have n + 1 − i edges (vi,oi),(vi,oi+1)...(vi,on), connecting to objects
oi,oi+1,...,on; their weights are pi,pi+1,...,pn respectively. If no object is allocated the
structure still generates revenue dq so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue. 
Now QCMO bids are the special case where all discounts are zero. Discounted symmetric
n-tuple bids are the special case where q = n. We now look at general n-tuples where
discounts may be decreasing.
Theorem 12 Combinatorial auctions with quantity constrained discounted symmetric n-
tuple bids of the form (o1,p1,...,on,pn,q,d2,...,dq) where dj ≥
Pj−1
k=2 dk for all j = 3...q,
and pi > dq (for all i) are tractable and can be solved by nonbipartite matching.
Proof. The appropriate structure is the extension of Figure 9 (centre) to handle q objects,
and then extra edges to handle the extra objects oq+1,...,on, as described in Theorem 11
above. If no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue
Pq
k=2 dk so this must
be subtracted from the overall revenue. 
This is one simple structure that generalises easily, but more arrangements are possible.
With this structure the discounts can only increase after the third allocation. A decreased
discount is allowed only on the third allocation. We can shift the place where a decreased
discount can happen further down the line by rearranging the structure, for example copying
the ideas of Figure 10 (centre and right). However we will always suﬀer limitations similar
to those discussed in the superadditive case (Section 3.8). Decreasing discounts (just like
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superadditivity) can only come in pairs, we can never have two in sequence; the best we
can do is: big discount, little discount, big discount, little discount, ...where “big” means
at least twice the previous one.
3.7 Asymmetric Subadditive Bids
We have tended to focus on symmetric discounts because there is no general concise formula
we can give for asymmetric n-tuple bids; asymmetric means that we are intending to put
bespoke discounts on each singleton, pair, etc. This gives a lot of possibilities for a large
n-tuple when compared with the symmetric case which was limited to assigning discounts
for each of the n − 1 symmetric possibilities. Let us ﬁrstly focus on the triple case to see
what is possible. The allocation of the whole triple can only have one value, so there is no
symmetry issue to discuss; the interesting cases are the pairs. In a triple {o1,o2,o3} there
are three possible pairs: {o1,o2} and {o2,o3} and {o1,o3}. Suppose each is to have a unique
discount: d12,d23,d13 with d12 > d23 > d13. Now each singleton oi is oﬀered at price pi, so
there must be an alternating path by which each oi can obtain this value. If any one of these
paths is taken it must disable the others, so that they cannot be subsequently allocated at
full price. Paths may end by making an edge matched (when it was unmatched before) or
unmatched (when it was matched before). A path which disables something must end by
making an edge matched (note that every vertex on a path is matched, except possibly the
last, which is not matched iﬀ the path ends by making an edge unmatched). Now given
that o1 is allocated we want to be able to allocate o3 for a price o3−d13, therefore we need a
separate path for o3 which oﬀers this discount (we could have chosen to make this separate
path for o1, it is an equivalent alternative). Alternatively, suppose that o3 is allocated ﬁrst,
we then want to be able to allocate o2 for a price o2 − d23, therefore we need a separate
path for o2 which oﬀers this discount (we could have chosen to make this separate path for
o1, it is an equivalent alternative). Now we have the appropriate discounts for the pairs
{o2,o3} and {o1,o3}. However if we want to allocate {o1,o2}, our matching algorithm will
use the singleton path allocation for o1 and the o2 −d23 discounted path for o2, giving us a
total value o1 +o2 −d23. This is greater than the o1 +o2 −d12 discounted value we desired.
Our d12 discount is not achievable. The fundamental limitation is that we cannot create a
discounted path for o2 which is available only if o3 has been already allocated; o3 is itself a
disabling path, not an enabling one. Graph matching can only match or unmatch edges; it
cannot disable one thing and enable another. Thus when we created the discounted path to
achieve d23, we in fact made a path for object o2, it did not capture a relationship among
objects o2 and o3.
In an n-tuple, there will be n(n − 1)/2 pairs, and every time we make a discounted
path for an object oi we will in fact be making a path which allows any pair with oi to be
allocated. Let us create discounted paths for pairs in order of smallest discount ﬁrst. When
we create the ﬁrst path (for some object oi), we determine the discount for n−1 pairs (i.e.
all pairs which contain this object), when we create the second path (for some other object
oj) we determine the discount for n − 2 pairs (because {oi,oj} already has a better value),
and so on (n−3,n−4...) until one is left (n−(n−1) = 1). We have created n−1 paths.
Therefore of the n(n − 1)/2 possible pairs, we can assign unique discounts to only n − 1.
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Generalising further, an n-tuple contains
 n
k

possible subsets of size k. Of these, how
many can have a unique discount? It is certainly no more than n as we create discounts
by creating paths for up to n objects; however n is not achievable because (as above) we
run out of unique elements to use for a discounted path. The maximum number of unique
elements will be given by the size of the smallest hitting set of the subsets. This number is
n − k + 1. To see this note that when we make the ﬁrst discounted path we are left with  n−1
k

subsets which do not use the object we just made a path for. After the second we are
left with
 n−2
k

subsets and so on until the top becomes k and we are left with one subset.
This happens at the (n − k)th step, after which we can make one more unique discount,
giving n − k + 1.
Theorem 13 In a combinatorial auction, for any bid on a set of n objects, the maximum
number of nonempty nonsingleton subsets over which XOR price oﬀers can be placed is
2n −(n+1). A subadditive auction which is solvable by graph matching (or DCS), can give
a unique discount to a maximum of n(n − 1)/2 of these.
Proof. 2n − (n + 1) is the total number of subsets less the singletons and the empty
allocation. For all other subsets of any size k, the maximum number of subsets of size k
for which a unique discount can be placed is n − k + 1 (see paragraph above Theorem).
Summing these up for k = 2...n gives n(n − 1)/2. 
Note that this applies to QCMO bids as well as n-tuples.
3.8 Superadditive Bids
We have seen a limited degree of superadditivity in our quadruple and n-tuple bids already,
but there we never had an allocated object exceeding its individual price; i.e. the value
increase due to allocating an extra object onto a bundle never exceeded the value of that
object allocated as a singleton. This would be a stronger type of superadditivity. Corollary 1
has shown us that there is only one way that we can get a greater value increase by adding
an object o2 after an object (or collection) o1, than the singleton value of o2. That one
way is to use nonbipartite matching, and to make the tail ends of the alternating paths for
o1 and o2 meet. Exploiting this method we can do a superadditive pair bid, as shown in
Figure 10 (left).
Deﬁnition 3.8 A superadditive pair bid is a bid of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,c2) which repre-
sents an XOR over the following oﬀers: p1 is the price oﬀered for object o1, p2 is the price
oﬀered for object o2 and (p1 + p2 + c2) is the price oﬀered for the bundle {o1,o2}, where
c2 > 0.
(Read c2 as the surcharge for a pair.) Note that if we solved this as an OR auction rather
than an XOR the allocation would be the same, because the auctioneer will never allocate
the two as singletons if the pair value is greater (this applies in all superadditive cases).
Theorem 14 Combinatorial auctions with superadditive pair bids of the form
(o1,p1,o2,p2,c2) where c2 > 0 are tractable and can be solved by nonbipartite matching.
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Figure 10: Nonbipartite structure to model a superadditive pair bid (left). Nonbipartite
structure to model a quintuple bid with no discounts (centre) and with discounts
(right).
Proof. For each pair bid of the form (o1,p1,o2,p2,c2), we add the structure of Figure 10
(left) to our graph. If no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue c2 so this
must be subtracted from the overall revenue. We can see that if one object is allocated the
c2 link is broken, losing c2 revenue, but the object link costs pi +c2 so the net gain is pj as
desired. If a second is allocated the increase in value is pi + c2, as desired. 
We now present a theorem to show that structures for superadditivity over pairs do not
extend to n-tuples as nicely as they did in the subadditive case. Firstly let us formalise our
notion of symmetry:
Deﬁnition 3.9 A symmetric n-tuple bid represents an XOR over price oﬀers for every
subset of the bundle, where the price oﬀers satisfy the following constraints. An individual
value is expressed for each singleton in the n-tuple, but for any two (not necessarily disjoint)
subsets S1 and S2 where |S1| = |S2|, the value diﬀerence v1 = v(S1)−
P
s∈S1 v(s) must equal
v2 = v(S2) −
P
s∈S2 v(s); where the v(·) function gives the value placed on a subset of the
n-tuple. It can be seen that a symmetric n-tuple bid can be completely described by a tuple
(o1,p1,...,on,pn,δ2,...,δn), giving the n objects and their singleton prices and a sequence
δ2,...,δn of n − 1 discounts or surcharges (let us generically refer to these as deltas, with
a positive delta being a surcharge and a negative one being a discount). There must be no
delta for the allocation of a singleton, therefore we say δ1 = 0.
The type of superadditivity we are interested in is where the tuple is selling for more
than the sum of its singletons; this requires that some object is allocated for more than its
singleton value, i.e. there is some δi for i ∈ [2,n] such that δi − δi−1 > 0. For convenience
let us deﬁne inci to be the increase in value brought by the ith allocation, not counting the
singleton value of the object allocated; i.e. inci = δi − δi−1.
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Theorem 15 In a symmetric auction which is solvable by graph matching, for any n-tuple
bid of the form (o1,p1,...,on,pn,δ2,...,δn):
1. For all i ∈ [1,n]: inci > 0 implies inci−1 ≤ 0
2. Each positive pair brings a smaller increment than all previous ones; i.e. for all
i ∈ [2,n]: inci > 0 implies that for all j ∈ [1,i − 1]: incj + incj−1 ≥ inci + inci−1
Proof. For Part 1: Corollary 1 has shown that the only way to achieve more than the
singleton price for an object i is if the alternating path added for its allocation meets end
on end with some earlier path. This means that the allocation of some earlier object has
“set-up”2 a path which the ith allocation can exploit. That earlier allocation must be the
(i − 1)th. This can be proven by observing that each “set-up” path must be exploited
immediately by the next allocation. Let the qth allocation be the ﬁrst to set-up a path, this
is then available to be exploited by any subsequent object allocation (because of symmetry,
all objects have equal ability to get deltas). Then the (q+1)th allocation must exploit it by
taking the most expensive edge that touches the end of qs path, because after each object
added to the allocation a maximum weight matching is computed, and no other path will
give (q +1) a value greater than this. Observe also that the qth allocation cannot generate
more value than its singleton value, this follows because we have said that it is the ﬁrst
to set-up a path. When the (q + 1)th allocation exploits qs path, it has used the most
expensive edge that touched the end of qs path, so there is no subsequent path that can
touch this end to get more value. Therefore no subsequent allocation can be worth more
than its singleton value unless there is another allocation which performs another set-up.
Thus we have established that every allocation i with inci > 0 must immediately follow an
allocation (i − 1) with inci−1 ≤ 0.
For Part 2: If inci is positive then object i used a path set-up by i−1, and i−1, being
a set-up a path, cannot have exploited any previous set-up. Now (by symmetry) all objects
have equal status, and equal access to exploit paths, and we know from Corollary 1 that
the pair of paths taken by objects (i − 1,i) would be worth at least as much if they had
been taken before other objects instead of after; this is because the paths (i − 1,i) meet
end to end, so their ends are not free to touch any other paths. Therefore the paths which
(i−1,i) took were available to any allocations (j−1,j) for all j ∈ [1,i−1], and would have
been taken, if they were worth more. Therefore the later pair (i−1,i) is worth at most the
same as any earlier pair (j − 1,j). 
Corollary 2 The only way for a delta to exceed all previous deltas is if it is part of a
sequence starting at the ﬁrst delta and ending at some index k, and having the following
properties:
1. For each even i ∈ [4,k]: δi > δi−2 and inci ≤ inci−2.
2. For each odd i ∈ [3,k]: inci ≤ 0 and inci ≤ inci−2.
2. We will use “set-up” with this speciﬁc meaning, i.e. the end of one alternating path has removed an edge
from the matching, and that removed edge touched a high weight edge which is now free to be matched
by a subsequent path.
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(i.e. the even deltas are monotonically increasing, the odd ones are at best static)
Proof. For Part 1: The ﬁrst delta (δ1) is zero, so to get a delta that exceeds all previous
ones requires that it be positive, which can only be achieved if inci is positive for some
i. This applies for all i ∈ [2,k]; to get a δi that exceeds all previous ones requires that
inci is positive. Theorem 15 shows us that positive incs come in pairs, where the ﬁrst is a
set-up, and the second reaps the increment. This shows that we can achieve a sequence as
indicated. To show that there can be no break in the sequence, suppose that we have some
i so that δi exceeds all previous deltas (implying inci + inci−1 > 0) but which is not part
of such a sequence; i.e. there is some previous even j with δj ≤ δj−2. If δj−2 is lower than
δj then this means that allocation j and its set-up j − 1 have not brought any increment.
Therefore incj + incj−1 ≤ 0 < inci + inci−1 which violates Theorem 15 Part 2. The claim
inci ≤ inci−2 is a consequence of Theorem 15 Part 2: for a consecutive sequence of three
allocations we have inci−1 + inci−2 ≥ inci + inci−1.
For Part 2: inci ≤ 0 follows from the proof of Part 1 because each odd allocation must
be a set-up for the subsequent even one, and set-ups cannot exploit any edge at the end
of their paths. Similar to the even case, the claim inci ≤ inci−2 follows because if a later
set-up has a lower discount, it would have been taken earlier. 
Corollary 3 The only way for a delta to exceed zero is if it is part of a sequence starting
at the ﬁrst delta and ending at some index k, and having the following properties:
• For each even i ∈ [4,k]: δi > 0 and inci ≤ inci−2.
• For each odd i ∈ [3,k]: inci ≤ 0 and inci ≤ inci−2.
Proof. If delta dips below zero at any even i, then no subsequent pair can bring it above
zero. Say i is the ﬁrst even index where δi < 0, this means inci + inci−1 < 0, and to
bring delta above zero a subsequent inck+inck−1 would need to exceed zero, which violates
Theorem 15. 
This is a severe limitation on symmetric bids; if we want deltas to increase we can only
do it in a very constrained pairwise fashion, i.e. each even numbered allocation bringing
an increase. We show two possible schemes for symmetric superadditive bids over a quin-
tuple in Figure 10 (centre and right). In the central structure we see the symmetric bid
(o1,p1,...,o5,p5,0,c2,c2,c2 + c4,c2 + c4). This is an example with monotonically increas-
ing deltas; this is the maximum that can be got from a quintuple. The constraints are:
f > c2 ≥ c4; c2 can be anything. If no object is allocated the structure still generates rev-
enue 5f, so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue. In the right hand structure
we see the following symmetric bid:
(o1,p1,...,o5,p5, 0, c2, c2 − (f2 − f1), c2 − (f2 + f3 − 2f1), c2 + c5 − (f2 + 2f3 − 3f1))
The increments corresponding to these deltas are (starting with inc1): +c2, −(f2 − f1),
−(f3−f1), −(f3−f1−c5). This is an example where we have pushed the second increase onto
the ﬁfth allocation, by the use of discounts. The constraints are: f3 > f2 > f1 > c2 ≥ c4
and f3 > c5 and pi > f2−f1 (for all i); c2 can be anything, but if it is large then subsequent
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discounts will need to be larger. If no object is allocated the structure still generates revenue
2(f1+f3)+f5, so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue. Note that it is pointless
to make the f values on either side of a surcharge diﬀerent; whatever is taken away by the
second f will be given back by the surcharge, so one may as well make the surcharge less
instead. One further point to note is that the allocation order indicated in Figure 10 (right)
is not the only possibility; if c5 > f3 − f2 then f2 will be used in the third allocation, but
then released in favour of c5 for the fourth allocation, and then f2 will be taken again for
the ﬁfth allocation. It should be easy to see how the structures in these ﬁgures generalise
to n-tuples.
Deﬁnition 3.10 A general super/subadditive symmetric n-tuple bid is a symmetric n-tuple
bid (see Deﬁnition 3.9) which has an opening sequence of deltas satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 15 and Corollary 3 and thereafter consists of consecutive sequences (δi,...,δj)
from the following possibilities:
• Plain discounts so that the sequence is constrained as in Theorem 10.
• Decreasing discounts so that the sequence is constrained as in Theorem 12.
Obviously we could also add in the possibility of quantity constraints here, but we have
omitted it to keep things simple.
Theorem 16 Combinatorial auctions with general super/subadditive symmetric n-tuple bid
are tractable and can be solved by nonbipartite matching.
Proof. For the opening sequence the appropriate structure is a generalisation of Figure 10
(centre) to handle x objects. Thereafter the discounting sequences use the structures from
Figure 9 (left and centre). If no object is allocated the structure still generates the revenue
of the fi edges, so this must be subtracted from the overall revenue. 
This still leaves the asymmetric case open, with asymmetry we can deﬁne a triple bid
where the surcharges are wired to particular objects. For example suppose we give a small
surcharge between o1 and o2 and also between o1 and o3, but if o3 is purchased after o2
we give a large surcharge. This would mean that the allocations {o1} and {o1,o2} and
{o1,o2,o3} would have increasing values, something not possible in the symmetric case.
The value of the triple {o1,o2,o3} would exceed the values of the singletons it is composed
of. However the loss of symmetry manifests itself if we allocate {o2,o3} as we then get a
larger delta than we got for {o1,o2}. In this case the value of the triple does not exceed the
value of the pair {o2,o3} and the singleton {o1} (note the that the {o2,o3} surcharge must
give back the {o1,o2} surcharge in the allocation {o1,o2,o3}).
Theorem 17 Consider auctions which are solvable by graph matching techniques, and
where each bid is placed on a bundle of objects, and consists of an XOR over valuations for
every subset of that bundle (i.e. we are not considering auctions where indivisible bundles
are present). In symmetric or asymmetric bids where the value of a complete set S of objects
is V, there exists a partition P of S into subsets of size ≤ 2 such that V does not exceed the
sum of the values of these subsets.
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Proof. If there are no allocations which bring a greater increment than their singleton
value, then let P partition S into singletons and we are done, because V does not exceed
the value of its singletons. If there are allocations which can bring a greater increment than
their singleton value, then each such allocation must have been set-up by the allocation of
some other object oj. As stated in the proof of Theorem 15 (Part 1) the only way to set-up
such an increase is when the end of one path removes an edge from the matching, so that
a subsequent path can add an expensive edge which touches the removed end. A diﬀerence
now with the symmetric case is that a number of subsequent allocations may get increasing
value from this set-up. Furthermore, the object oi which can get the maximum increase
from the path which oj has set-up (this means that ois path has the most expensive edge
touching the end of ojs path) may be able to get more value from a subsequent set-up path.
We need some way to identify the appropriate pairs which will appear in the partition P.
Consider the maximum weight matching of the graph when the whole of S is allocated.
Now calculate the change in value ∆i resulting from removing each singleton oi from the
graph (and then replacing it before the next removal), and subtract the singleton value pi
from this giving δi = ∆i − pi. Also keep a record of the alternating path Pi which was
applied to the graph when mwm(S) was transformed to mwm(S − {oi}) (there is a slight
abuse of notation here because S is not a graph, but a set of objects; we mean the graph
with all objects allocated). Now pick the oi which has the greatest δi, if its delta is positive
then its path Pi must overlap with the last edge ej at the end of another path Pj. The
reason that they overlap rather than touch is that when the set-up path oj was added its
path did not include ej, it merely touched one end of ej. When Pi is subsequently applied
it does include ej. If oj is subsequently removed from mwm(S) then Pj is applied and it
does remove ej from the matching. Now we know the pair {oi,oj} has a valuation which
takes the maximal value from the set-up; we want this pair to be in our partition P. We
know that the increase brought by allocating the pair {oi,oj} alone is at least as large as
the reduction in V from removing them. This follows from Corollary 1 because the only way
a pair could be worth more afterward than before is if the ends of their paths touched the
ends of some existing paths, but since {oi,oj} touch each others’ ends they can touch no
others. Therefore when we move {oi,oj} out of S and into our partition P, we are putting
at least as much value into the partition as we are taking from S. We continue this process:
identify the highest δk in the remaining graph, ﬁnd the ol whose path overlaps Pk, move
the pair {ok,ol} to the partition P. When the highest remaining δ is not positive we can
take all the remaining objects as singletons and put them in P. 
Note that the claim in the theorem must say “does not exceed” instead of “equals”
because the previous subsections on subadditive tuples have shown that it could be less.
Also, we must say “there exists a partition” because it is not true that the value of the whole
set cannot exceed the value of the subsets in any partition. Consider the quadruple, we have
seen in Section 3.5 that the value of the whole quadruple could exceed the value of any two
pairs within it. However in that case the value of the quadruple was less than the sum of its
four singletons (hence the appropriate partition P consists of four singletons). Alternatively
we could construct a quadruple bid from two superadditive pairs, in which case the value
of the quadruple would exceed the sum of its four singletons, and the appropriate partition
P would be the two pairs.
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This Theorem is the most severe limitation we have encountered so far. It shows us that
our n-tuple bids (even if asymmetric) are not true n-tuples, but collections of pairs and
singletons. It is not possible for a bidder to express an increased valuation when there is a
synergy among ≥ 3 objects, he can only express increased valuations for positive synergies
among the pairs within the bundle. This is an important theorem as it shows the limit of
our graph matching techniques when tackling superadditive auctions. It does not however
prove that auctions which violate the condition are NP-hard, only that they cannot be
solved by graph matching.
3.8.1 Note on Tennenholtz’s Superadditive Auction
Tennenholtz (2002) has used the bipartite DCS structure depicted in Figure 11 to represent
a triple bid where the ﬁrst object is a forced sale, the second is allocated for more than the
ﬁrst (hence superadditivity) and the third is allocated for less than the second. Looking
o1
o2
o3
-b
3
v1
v2
p 1+a+b
p3+a+b
p2+a+b
-a
Figure 11: Tennenholtz’s bipartite structure to model a superadditive triple bid. the vertex
labelled 3 is degree constrained; it must have three matched edges incident.
at Figure 11 we can see that the minimum allocation is when one object is bought and v1
and v2 are matched; the revenue is then pi, for whatever i is allocated. A constraint on the
structure is a ≤ b, therefore if two objects are allocated the −b link will be broken ﬁrst; the
revenue will then be pi + pj + a + 2b, so the increase in value (δ = a + 2b) is more than for
a single object. If three objects are allocated the revenue will be p1 + p2 + p3 + 3a + 3b, so
the increase in value (δ = 2a+b) is less than for the second object. Recall that Theorem 2
said that no matter what clever bipartite structure we come up with, we cannot make a
later addition to a graph generate a greater increase in value than an earlier one. How
can a bipartite structure be used here to make the second allocation generate greater a
greater increase in revenue than the ﬁrst allocation? One can view the auctioneer as being
forced to accept at least one object, before he makes any decisions about what to accept
and reject. Therefore even though the allocation of the second object generates a greater
increase than the ﬁrst, the auctioneer could not choose to accept the second object in place
of the ﬁrst. Thus this does not violate Theorem 2 because the ﬁrst allocation is no addition
to the graph, it is the starting state.
The limitation of the structure is that the auctioneer could not accept any other higher
bid for these objects; at least one object must be allocated to this bidder even if the price is
poor. We can make an equivalent bid using our bipartite subadditive structure of Figure 5
(i.e. no need for DCS). Make the ﬁrst allocation have a price pi+2N where N is the largest
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weight in the graph, then subtract 2N from the ﬁnal revenue at the end. This guarantees
that one of these ﬁrst allocation links will be matched. Make the second allocation have
price pj + a + 2b, and the third have price pk + 2a + b. Is it superadditive or subadditive?
As we have formulated it it looks subadditive. As Tennenholtz (2002) has formulated it
it could be seen as superadditive if one imagines the allocation of no objects, and then
considers the increase in value after the ﬁrst is allocated, and after the second is allocated.
4. The Space of Possible Bids
In this section we analyse the space of possible bids, to show what matching techniques are
needed to handle each portion of the space, and to show which parts of the space are likely
to be intractable. In between the regions that can be handled by graph matching, and the
likely to be intractable (NP-hard) regions, there is an unknown region which can deﬁnitely
not be handled by our graph matching techniques, but which we have not proved to be
NP-hard.
4.1 Pair Space
To analyse the space of possible pair bids we need to consider the possibility that a bid
could express an XOR over a diﬀerent valuation for every possible allocation outcome.
There are four possible allocation outcomes for a pair: (00),(01),(10),(11). Thus we could
plot in a four dimensional space the regions in which bids are possible and what graph
matching techniques are needed to solve them. We will pick a single 3D hyperplane in this
4D space to illustrate, that is the hyperplane where the valuation on (00) is always zero.
This ﬁxes the bidder’s valuation for the empty allocation. As Myerson (1981) has shown,
if an auctioneer wants to get maximum revenue from an auction, then payments for the
empty allocation need to be considered; Myerson’s work has shown that all possibilities can
be necessary: an entry fee (a charge for getting nothing), payment to a bidder for getting
an object, and payment to a bidder for getting nothing (in addition to the most well known
case where a bidder pays for getting something). However this is for the pricing rule, which
is a separate issue from the valuations the bidders express for each allocation. Still, we
may want to consider the situation where a bidder expresses some valuation for getting
the empty allocation, especially a negative valuation. This could be plausible in a scenario
where the bidder will suﬀer some negative eﬀect if he participates in the auction and gets
nothing, as opposed to getting any object at all. This could be accommodated by adding v
to the weights on the edges for the ﬁrst allocation, and subtracting v from the ﬁnal revenue
for the whole auction. Then the ﬁnal revenue for the auction is reduced by v iﬀ that bidder
gets nothing.
We do not depict this (00) dimension in Figure 12. The ﬁgure shows the 3D space
(top left) and four vertical slices through the space (depicted below); on the top right is
the diagonal plane through the space which shows the possible symmetric singleton bids
(i.e. (01) = (10)). We do not need to consider values per unit greater than 1, as we can
ﬁnd the same bid by normalising to make the greatest of (01),(10),(11) have value 1. The
boundary between “forced sale DCS” and non-forced sale (grey) occurs when the minimum
singleton value is less than the pair value, as described in Section 3.2. The boundary
between subadditive and superadditive occurs when the pair price exceeds the sum of the
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singletons, and as noted by Theorems 2 to 4, it cannot be solved by bipartite matching, but
as noted by Theorem 14 it can be solved by nonbipartite matching. Note that every point
of the space can be solved by some graph matching technique.
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Figure 12: The regions of pair space in which bids are possible and the graph matching
techniques needed to solve them.
Theorem 18 Combinatorial auctions which allow XOR bids over all subsets of a bundle,
and where the maximum bundle size does not exceed two, are tractable for all possible bids,
and the optimal allocation can be computed by solving a nonbipartite weighted DCS.
Proof. In fact we do not need the full power of DCS in most cases, unless forced sales
are required we can use regular weighted matching. For each subadditive pair bid which is
placed, add the structure of Figure 3 to the graph. For each superadditive pair bid which
is placed, add the structure of Figure 10 (left) to the graph. For each singleton bid placed
simply add one vertex and connect to the object the bid is placed on, as described in the
beginning of Section 3. If there is a bid where the discount for a pair is greater than the
lowest singleton price oﬀer in the pair, then we need to use a DCS; make the degree 1
(u = l = 1) for each object on which such bids are placed. The maximum weight DCS in
this graph gives the optimal allocation. 
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4.2 Triple Space
The space of all possible triple bids is an 8D space where a point represents an XOR over val-
uations placed on each possible allocation outcome: (000),(001),(010),(100),(011),(101),
(110),(111). As with the pair case we do not depict the dimension where (000) varies.
Furthermore we chunk together (001),(010),(100) and (011),(101),(110) into a single di-
mension each, implying symmetry among singletons and pairs. We just do this to give us
a convenient number of dimensions to visualise; we have seen that complete asymmetry
among singletons is possible, and limited asymmetry among pairs is possible (Theorem 13).
This leaves us with a convenient three dimensions, representing the price oﬀered for a sin-
gleton, pair, or triple; we will refer to these dimensions as s,p,t. The space is depicted in
Figure 13. If we pick a 3D region within this space, we can use that to deﬁne constraints
on allowed bids in an auction. If the region we pick is entirely within the areas indicated as
solvable by graph matching techniques, then any auction which satisﬁes the corresponding
bidding constraints will be solvable by graph matching. For example, consider the top face:
the region indicated as “nonbipartite” has the total price of a pair and a singleton exceeding
a triple (i.e. 2p + s > 3t), therefore it ﬁts the constraints of Theorem 6, and an auction
consisting of a collection of bids within this region can be solved by using the nonbipartite
structure of Figure 8 for each bid.
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Figure 13: The regions of triple space in which bids result in tractable and likely intractable
auctions. For the tractable regions we indicate the graph matching techniques
that can solve them.
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Note that we do not need to consider values per unit greater than 1, as we can ﬁnd
the same bid by normalising to make the greatest of {s,p,t} be 1. The graph has a lot
of redundancy: if we consider any sub-cube contained within our unit cube (Figure 13,
bottom left) and with a vertex at the origin, then the sub-cube is isomorphic to the unit
cube. Alternately, if we trace a line from the origin, it will not cut through any regions
(excepting that the origin point itself is a special case). For this reason we can represent
the information in the unit cube by looking at these three faces: top face, right face and
back face. The front face is almost identical to the pair graph for symmetric singleton bids
(Figure 12, top right). The only diﬀerence is the nonbipartite region in the bottom right
which corresponds to the triple case where d2 ≤ d3 < 2d2 (see Section 3.4.2). The reason for
this diﬀerence is that we are now not only concerned with a pair, but we also have to worry
about forcing the triple price down to zero, and this can require a nonbipartite structure.
Recall that d2 is the discount for a pair (the diﬀerence between a singleton and a pair),
therefore d2 = 2(s − p); similarly d3 = 3(s − t). Plugging these into the inequality gives us
2(s − p) ≤ 3(s − t) < 4(s − p)
s + 2p
3
≥ t >
4p − s
3
(4.1)
This gives us the lower and upper bounds on this nonbipartite region. Only the bound
t >
4p−s
3 is relevant for the front face from zero to one. The triple price on this front face is
zero, so we have 0 >
4p−s
3 or s > 4p, which gives us that bottom right nonbipartite region of
the front face. We can calculate the region for the parallel planes behind the face similarly,
by plugging in the t values 1
3 and 2
3. The NP-equivalent region forms an oblique pyramid;
the pyramid’s base is the back face of the cube, and the pyramid’s apex is just behind the
cube’s origin.
4.2.1 Right Face of Unit Cube
The nonbipartite region deﬁned by Equation 4.1 appears in the centre of this face. On
this face we have s = 1 so Equation 4.1 becomes
1+2p
3 ≥ t >
4p−1
3 ; t’s lower bound cuts
the p axis at p = 1
4 and its upper bound cuts the t axis t = 1
3; the lines converge when
everything equals one. The bipartite region is on the other side of the bound t >
4p−1
3 ,
which corresponds to d3 ≥ 2d2 (Section 3.4.1). The unknown region is on the other side
of the bound
1+2p
3 ≥ t, which corresponds to d3 < d2, as described in Section 3.4.3; this is
superadditive, and as proved in Theorem 17, graph matching cannot handle it. We do not
know if it is tractable. We also get the forced sale problem with triples, and we need to
use a DCS. If the triple price per unit is less than one third of the singleton price we need
to force a sale, and also if the triple price per unit is less than two thirds of the pair price.
This gives us the hashed regions in Figure 12.
4.2.2 Top Face of Unit Cube
This face is mostly superadditive (and hence necessarily nonbipartite) as the pair price per
unit exceeds the singleton. The boundary into the unknown occurs for 3t > s + 2, i.e. the
total triple price begins to exceed the total price of a pair and a singleton (recall that the
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total price of a pair is ﬁxed at 2 on this face); Theorem 17 has proved that graph matching
cannot handle it, but again we do not know if it is tractable.
4.2.3 Back Face of Unit Cube (Excluding Unknown Boundaries)
Firstly we show that any point on this face (excluding the unknown boundaries) is NP-hard.
Let CAP3 denote the following problem: Finding the optimal allocation in a combinatorial
auction which allows XOR bids over all subsets of a bundle, and with bundle size ≤ 3. It is
already known that the CAP3 is NP-hard. Rothkopf et al. (1998) showed that a special case
of CAP3 is an instance of maximal 3-set packing3. This instance is the point indicated at
the bottom right of the back face. This means that CAP3 is NP-hard because at least some
subset of it is NP-hard, but as we have seen, CAP3 also has many subsets which are easy.
It is important to know which subsets are easy and hard. We want to extend the region of
known NP-hardness beyond this bottom right point, to prove that more subsets of CAP3
are NP-hard. Such a result is useful as it means that it would not be advisable to search
for polynomial algorithms for those instances. When we look for a tractable subset of the
CAP we are looking for some 3D region in triple space. We will show that any region which
includes a point on this back face represents a subset of the CAP which is NP-equivalent.
Note that strictly speaking the term “NP-complete” is only applicable to decision prob-
lems, however it seems to be conventional in much of the AI literature to apply it to search
problems (also called function problems); in this case what is really meant is that the search
problem is both NP-hard and NP-easy, or in other words NP-equivalent. We will use the
term NP-equivalent. To show NP-equivalence for a search problem we need to show that
an NP-complete problem can be reduced to it, and that it has a polynomial reduction to
an NP-complete problem.4
Theorem 19 Consider subsets of CAP3 which are deﬁned by placing restrictions on the
allowed bids; these restrictions take the form of constraints on the relative magnitudes of
the prices oﬀered for each of the possible subsets of a triple bid; the number of bids, or the
objects they bid on are unconstrained. Let triple-greater denote a bid type where the price
oﬀer for a triple exceeds the sum of the price oﬀers of the subsets in any partition of the
triple. Let S be the set of all subsets of CAP3 which allow at least some triple-greater bid
type. Every element of S is NP-equivalent.
Proof. Any element of S can solve any instance of Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C) and is
hence NP-hard because X3C is NP-complete (Garey & Johnson, 1979, p. 53); to transform
an X3C instance to any element of S simply construct an auction where the m objects
are the elements of the set from X3C (note m ≡ 0 (mod3)), and the bids are all triple-
greater bids with identical triple price t; these bids are placed on the objects representing
3. General k-set packing was shown to be NP-complete by Karp (1972) by reduction from clique, and the
special case of k ≤ 3 was shown by Garey and Johnson (1979) to be reducible from exact cover by 3-sets
4. This latter step seems not to have been done in the case of the CAP; a number of sources claim that
the CAP is NP-complete (by which they mean NP-equivalent), but without proving this latter step
(Rothkopf et al., 1998; Nisan, 2000; Sandholm, 2002). Sandholm (2002) claims it is NP-complete and
cites Karp (1972), but the Karp paper only proves NP-completeness for the set packing decision problem.
Note that de Vries and Vohra (2003) are careful to claim that the CAP is NP-hard while noting that
the decision version is NP-complete.
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the 3-element subsets from X3C. Note that all triple-greater bids have their triple price t
exceeding the sum of any partition of the triple, therefore the value of an optimal allocation
will equal tm/3 iﬀ there is an exact cover (otherwise the value of an optimal allocation must
be less). The search problem of ﬁnding an optimal allocation is therefore at least as hard
as the decision problem X3C (this proves the search problem is NP-hard).
To establish that it is NP-easy5 we make a decision version of the problem. The input to
the decision problem is an allocation value V to be achieved and a set B of bids; each bid is a
set of ≤ 7 bundles and price oﬀers, at most one of these bundles can be accepted (i.e. XOR
over the bundles in the bid). The decision problem returns “yes” if there exists an allocation
which picks at most one bundle from each bid, and the total value is ≥ V. It is easy to
see that the decision problem is in NP. Now we do a binary search (the same technique
as used by Garey and Johnson (1979, p. 116)) to ﬁnd the optimal allocation’s value V∗.
An upper bound on this can be found in linear time by computing the price per object of
each price oﬀer, ﬁnding the largest, and multiplying by the number of objects (similarly for
lower bound). Having found V∗ we then go through the bundles one by one, deleting them
from B and calling the decision problem again for (V∗,B). If the decision problem has a
negative answer after any deletion, then we put that bundle back in B. Eventually B is the
optimal allocation. It can be seen that the transformation is polynomial. 
This result is stronger than showing that any region which includes a point on our back
face represents a subset of the CAP which is NP-complete, because our back face only
represents symmetric bids, whereas triple-greater bids are more general. To see that all the
points on our back face represent triple-greater bids, note that they have t exceeding both
s and p.
4.2.4 Unknown Boundaries and Regions
We now analyse the left and top boundaries of the back face and the adjacent unknown
regions. We are not sure if there is a polynomial algorithm to solve auctions in these areas,
but we can expect algorithms to perform much better here than in the NP-equivalent area.
We cannot show that the left boundary is NP-hard as easily as the face, because if we give
it a 3-set packing problem, it may come back with a solution which covers the object with
singletons; similarly for the top boundary, it may come back with pairs. Nevertheless, if
bidders’ price oﬀers vary wildly, then it is unlikely to be optimal to accept a pair or singleton
from a high bidder, so it would seem necessary to solve weighted 3-set packing. Therefore we
can expect these areas (left and top boundaries) to be NP-hard. On the other hand, if price
oﬀers are comparable, a covering by pairs and singletons will give a reasonable allocation.
For the unknown region on the right face: if a singleton is worth more than a triple, then
even if there is an exact covering by 3-sets, we might prefer to replace an accepted triple
by three singletons. This will happen when the diﬀerences between competing bids are
small relative to the discounts. If there are a lot of bids relative to objects, then we can
guarantee that an exact covering by singletons is possible. This happens if each object is
covered by ≥ 3 bids (implying that the number of bids ≥ m, the number of objects). To
see this consider the bipartite graph (V1 ∪ V2,E) formed by having one vertex in V1 for
every bid, and all the objects in V2, so that each bid in V1 connects to three objects in V2.
5. This solution was proposed to me by Vincent Conitzer.
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Now any subset of the objects must be covered by a set of bids which is at least as large,
it is impossible for a small set of bids to cover a larger set of objects to a depth of three;
this guarantees that each object can be matched (see Hall’s theorem, (Bondy & Murty,
1976, p. 72)). Similarly for the unknown region on the top face: if a pair is worth more
than a triple, we might prefer to replace two accepted triples by three pairs, which will
happen when the diﬀerences between competing bids are small relative to the discounts.
Guaranteeing that an allocation consisting entirely of pairs exists is more diﬃcult than the
analogous condition in the case of accepting singletons. This is because for pairs we are
matching two objects, which cannot be matched by representing a bid with a single vertex,
as we did in the bipartite graph for the singleton case. However we could summarise by
saying that, for both of these regions, if objects are covered by many bids, then ignoring
triples and calculating a matching of pairs and singletons is likely to lead to a close to
optimal allocation. On the other hand if bidding is sparse, calculating the exact optimal
allocation may well be feasible; exact cover by 3-sets is solvable in polynomial time if no
element is covered by more than two subsets (Garey & Johnson, 1979, p. 221). Finally
if the bidding is mixed, with some objects heavily covered, and others sparsely, then the
problem may well be intractable.
Indeed the above arguments also apply across the NP-equivalent area of the back face:
as we get closer to the unknown boundaries, algorithms can be expected to have a better
performance; this would apply to approximation algorithms in particular, e.g. if s ≈ 1
and each object is covered by ≥ 3 bids and competing bids are similar, then a covering by
singletons will be close to optimal (and this is easy to compute by treating bids as quantity
constrained with q = 1, see Section 3.1).
4.3 Quadruple Space (and beyond)
We will describe the quadruple case brieﬂy as the region boundaries are calculated in a
similar fashion as for the triples. This time we ﬁx s = 1 and we look at p versus t for
various values of q (the price per unit of a quadruple). The left diagram of Figure 14 shows
a view of triple space using this same perspective, for comparison purposes; it is interesting
to see how close matching techniques can take us to the region of known NP-equivalence.
The diagram to the right of this (Figure 14 for q = 0) has a more limited tractable
region because of the requirement that q = 0; if p is quite small, then discounts on t
and q need to be greater, making it diﬃcult to achieve q = 0. The three labels a,b,c
indicate the structure needed to solve auctions in the region labelled. The structures are
the three subadditive triple structures of Section 3.4. Label a is for the bipartite structure
of section 3.5.1 with constraints d4 ≥ 2d3 −d2 and d3 ≥ 2d2. Label b is for the nonbipartite
structure of section 3.5.2 with constraints d3 ≥ d2 and d4 ≥ d3 + d2. Label c is for the
nonbipartite structure of section 3.5.3 with constraints d4 ≥ d3 > 2d2. As in the triple
diagram, we can see how the bipartite is just a special case within the nonbipartite (general
matching) region.
The diagram to the right of this (Figure 14 for q = 1) shows the square of NP-equivalence
for 4-set packing at the origin; this square grows larger and larger as q increases. Note that
we need the full power of our superadditive structures to achieve the tractable region in
this q = 1 diagram. We use a structure similar to Figure 10 (right), except removing the
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Figure 14: The left diagram shows an alternative view of triple space, for comparison. The
remaining diagrams show the regions of quadruple space in which bids result in
tractable and likely intractable auctions. For the tractable regions we indicate
the graph matching techniques that can solve them.
vertex with the f2 edges. With this we can achieve any pair surcharge, and any subsequent
discount for the triple and quadruple. The diagram also shows a limit encroaching on the
superadditive region (the line coming from the top left). This is because with q = 1 the
price of a quadruple is 4, and if t is small we need a substantial second surcharge to make
the jump from 3t to 4q; when p is also small the ﬁrst surcharge is small, and therefore a
large second surcharge is unachievable. What we are seeing here is the constraint due to
Part 1 of Corollary 2, i.e. inci ≤ inci−2. In this diagram we have ﬁxed s = 1 and q = 1; our
constraint is that the second surcharge cannot exceed the ﬁrst; this means 2p−s ≥ 4q−3t,
which gives us p ≥ 5−3t
2 .
The diagram to the right of this (Figure 14 for q = 2) also shows this limit, but we see
that it is covering relatively less area. As q increases its slope remains constant, and its
intercept with the square of NP-equivalence happens at t =
2q+1
3 , which is 12
3 when q = 2.
Note that we are getting much more reach here than in the analogous triple case, because
the quadruple price can exceed the triple price plus the singleton price (4q > 3t+s), whereas
the triple price cannot exceed the pair price plus the singleton price (3t ≯ 2p + s). To see
this in the diagrams notice that if we increase t in the leftmost diagram (Figure 14) we are
forced to also increase p, or we quickly get into NP-equivalent territory; in contrast, in the
rightmost diagram (Figure 14 for q = 2) if we imagine increasing q (moving in the third
dimension), we see that it is the price of p relative to q that is the more limiting factor,
rather than the price of t relative to q.
Imagining the space of n-tuple bids we can see that the square of NP-equivalence in
Figure 14 (right) will appear in every new dimension we extend to: oﬀers where the n-
tuple price exceeds its partitions will always be NP-hard for n ≥ 3. This is the major
limitation on our auctions; for large n the vast majority of the space is NP-hard. However
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when we move to the region which has superadditivity for pairs, this will allow a certain
amount of superadditivity in the quadruple, sextuple, octuple, etc. so we will have some
tractability along this dimension. Note that by “superadditivity” here we mean speciﬁcally
that the increase in value due to adding another object can exceed the singleton value of
that object. If we broaden “superadditivity” to mean that the n-tuple exceeds the sum of
all its singletons, then we also have some tractability along the dimensions for the triple,
quintuple, septuple, etc. As for the subadditive case we will see, as in Figure 14, that this
also gets less coverage as we increase n. However, most of the subadditive regions which
cannot be covered by matching techniques correspond to auctions where subsets of the
n-tuple have large discounts, but the whole n-tuple has a small discount relative to these
subsets. This has a superadditive ﬂavour (later additions bring a greater increase in revenue
than earlier ones). This is probably a rather unlikely bidding region, it may make sense for
the bidders to simply bid on smaller tuples (the large discounts on the larger sets eﬀectively
mean those sets are worthless).
4.4 Discussion of Limitations
Here we will discuss what can and cannot be done, and why. We will brieﬂy discuss three
issues:
1. Why is subadditive easy with graph matching, but superadditive is not?
2. Why is a superadditive pair solvable with graph matching, but a triple is not, yet
subadditivity suﬀers no such limit in moving from two to three or beyond?
3. Why is two easy, but three is NP-hard?
For the ﬁrst question we need to go back to Corollary 1. Our graph must allow singletons
to be purchased at unit price. Therefore no single object can release any more value from
the graph than its singleton value unless a previous allocation has set it up for an increase
(by ends of paths touching). As we have seen, these set-ups are limited to pairs. What we
really want for superadditivity is that later additions could cause larger and larger increases
in value. Maximum weight graph matching is biased towards maximising; if there is more
value to be extracted, it will extract it immediately. This is no problem for subadditivity,
because the best links are taken ﬁrst by the matching algorithm, leaving lower cost ones
for later additions. We could reverse this bias and use minimum weight graph matching
instead; however we would then have the problem that the auctioneer would now be trying
to take the lowest bids oﬀered for each object. What we really want is maximising on
the vertices representing objects (i.e. to pick the maximum weight incident edges, from
all those edges oﬀered by diﬀerent bids), but minimising on the vertices representing bids
(for each bid structure it should match the edges oﬀering lowest weight ﬁrst; this would
require a maximum cardinality, minimum weight matching). We could not expect to ﬁnd a
polynomial algorithm for this matching problem however. Indeed having a solely maximising
bias is what makes it easy to make a polynomial algorithm; there is one direction to the
algorithm: always apply alternating paths which increase the weight of the matching.
For the second question we are looking at the fundamental limitation of 2D-matching.
An edge in a 2D graph connects only two things, 3D matching in hypergraphs could get
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over this, but polynomial algorithms are not known. In the 2D case, because an edge can
connect two things it can express relationships over two things, and hence we can have a
superadditive pair by making a special edge which is triggered if two objects are allocated.
We can also turn oﬀ an edge if two objects are allocated, or we can handle situations where
one object is allocated and the other is not. Hence we can fully express any relationship
among two things. This is not true for three or more. In the subadditive case we do not have
full expressiveness for three, four and beyond (i.e. subadditivity does suﬀer a limitation in
moving from two to three and beyond). We have seen in the asymmetric subadditive case
(Section 3.7) that out of the
 n
k

possible subsets of size k a maximum of only n−k+1 can
be given a discount. We cannot express relationships among n objects, we can only count
how many have been allocated and force a diﬀerent edge to be taken when the number of
objects already allocated has exhausted all more expensive paths.
For the third question we want to see if graph matching can give us any insight into why
problems like set packing are easy for two but hard for three. We can simplify things by
ignoring weights. Consider auctions where bids are placed for “all or nothing”6 bundles and
all prices are one.7 We know that this auction is tractable for bundles of size two (pairs),
but NP-hard for bundles of size three. To solve the pairs case by graph matching we can
use Rothkopf et al.’s (1998) structure where the vertices consist solely of the objects, and
the bids are edges connecting pairs of objects. To have a polynomial algorithm we need
some way to search the space of solutions incrementally, making some decisions on which we
will never have to backtrack; whereas a brute force algorithm would not make any deﬁnite
decision before completing an exhaustive search. We can see how graph matching does this
in the pairs case. Suppose we start with some greedy allocation that simply matches every
edge it ﬁnds which has both ends exposed. We have already found some deﬁnite information:
every vertex matched by this greedy method will be matched in the ﬁnal allocation. The
graph matching algorithm works by successive augmenting paths, which will never expose
a matched vertex. From the point of view of the auction it means that once we match two
objects o1 and o2 in a bid, we are certain that both of them will sell.
Now let us consider all or nothing bids for triples, with price one. This corresponds to
matching in a 3D hypergraph. If we do a greedy allocation, and match three objects, there
is no guarantee that any of them will sell (i.e. some will sell, but one cannot identify which
ones after the greedy phase). Say the graph has seven objects and three (hyper)edges,
so that matching six objects is possible, using just two of the edges. Also assume that
all objects are incident to some edge. We may have picked the wrong edge in our greedy
phase, i.e. the edge incident to the seventh object. Consider the analogous situation in the
2D case: the graph has ﬁve objects and three edges (and all objects are incident to some
edge), so that matching four objects is possible, using just two of the edges. In this case,
whatever edge we initially pick will be part of the maximum matching because there are
two optimal solutions. This is one factor that makes the 2D case easy: it has more optimal
solutions, whereas the optimal 3d matching is more likely to be unique. This however is
not the crucial diﬀerence. Consider the 2D case again, but this time suppose one of the ﬁve
objects is not connected with the rest of the graph. Now one of the edges in the graph is
6. Nisan (2000) calls these “single minded” bids.
7. Note that b-matching cannot handle all or nothing bids. If we connect a vertex with a b-value n to an
n-tuple, it must match all, and nothing is not an option.
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adjacent to the remaining two, and it does not appear in the maximum matching. Suppose
we picked that edge greedily; it is still true that both objects matched by that edge will
appear in the maximum matching, and we can achieve the maximum matching by a single
augmenting path which removes this edge and adds the two edges touching its ends. Thus
a partial matching in the 2D case can be transformed into an alternative one by following
an augmenting path, and in following the path from one end to the other, each ﬂipped edge
will force one adjacent edge to be ﬂipped. In the 3D case if we want to transform a partial
matching, each new edge we try to add may force us to change two adjacent edges, and
changing these adjacent edges may force us to change four, eight, sixteen ...; so in the
worst case we have an exponentially growing tree of changes; this tree is the analogue of an
alternating path in the 2D case.
5. Complexity Results
This section gives the time complexity for computing the optimal allocation in the auctions
described in Section 3. We group the auctions in two classes: those solvable by bipartite
matching and those solvable by nonbipartite matching. Finally, in Section 5.3, we look at
how some tricks can be employed to handle Quantity Constrained and Multi-Unit bids.
5.1 Optimal Winner Determination in Auctions with Bipartite Structures
Theorem 20 For combinatorial auctions with m objects for sale, allowing OR-of-XOR
bids, where each XOR is a quantity constrained discounted subadditive symmetric n-tuple
bid as described in Theorem 11, and where the maximum size of a tuple is s, and there are
b tuple bids, and N is the maximum value of a singleton price oﬀer, the optimal allocation
can be computed in O(
√
m + bs bs2 log(N(m + bs))) time. The speed up factor of Section
2 can improve this by a factor of (2 −
logbs2
log(m+bs)).
Proof. We use bipartite matching, using Gabow’s scaling algorithm (see Section 2). The
maximum number of vertices is m+bs, i.e. m objects and a maximum of s bidding vertices
for each of the b tuple bids. The maximum number of edges is bs2, i.e. no more than
s2 edges for each of the b tuple bids (the number of edges is actually
n(n+1)
2 for normal
discounted subadditive symmetric n-tuple bids). 
From this we can see that the performance scales much better with increasing numbers
of bids than with increasing tuple size. The number of objects hardly inﬂuences the per-
formance. Note that the construction of the graph, from the tuple bids, takes time which
is linear in the size of the graph (and hence insigniﬁcant compared to the matching algo-
rithm’s time complexity), but polynomial in the size of the tuples. The space requirement
is likewise roughly bs2.
5.2 Optimal Winner Determination in Auctions with Nonbipartite Structures
Theorem 21 For combinatorial auctions with m objects for sale, allowing OR-of-XOR
bids, where each XOR is a general super/subadditive symmetric n-tuple bid as described in
Deﬁnition 3.10 (or indeed any other bid for which we have provided a graphical structure),
and where the maximum size of a tuple is s, and there are b such tuples, and N is the max-
44Tractable Combinatorial Auctions via Graph Matching
imum weight of a singleton price oﬀer, or a superadditive increment (whichever is greater),
the optimal allocation can be computed in
O(
p
(m + bs) α(bs2,m + bs)log(m + bs) bs2 log(N(m + bs))) time,
which is roughly O(
p
(m + bs)log(m + bs) bs2 log(N(m + bs))).
Proof. We use nonbipartite matching, using Gabow’s scaling algorithm (see Section 2).
The maximum number of vertices is O(m + bs), i.e. m objects and a maximum of 2s
bidding vertices for each of the b tuple bids. The maximum number of edges is O(bs2), i.e.
a maximum of s2 + s − 2 edges for each of the b tuple bids. 
The expression looks long, but saying it is roughly O(bs2) would not be far oﬀ. The
same comment as above (in Section 5.1) on performance and graph construction applies
here.
5.3 Eﬃcient Handling of Quantity Constrained and Multi-Unit Bids
In a quantity constrained bid all the vertices from the bid (left, or V1) side are identical (we
represented it with
n(n+1)
2 edges in Figure 1, but it is easy to see how the bidding vertices
can be made identical, using a total of n2 edges). Identical vertices can be compressed
before the weighted matching algorithm is called, and expanded after. The same applies if
multiple units are on oﬀer. Suppose that each bidder only desires a single unit of an object,
but many bidders want a unit of this particular object. The uncompressed representation
would have a vertex in V2 for each unit of the object, and each bidder would place a QCMO
bid (with q = 1) covering each unit. In eﬀect the bidders are placing an XOR over all the
units, to maximise their chance of getting one. All of the units of the object now have
identical incident edges. In the compressed version we can represent that object by a single
vertex, and expand it out to multiple identical vertices later. If bidders desire a number g of
units (g > 1), but do not decrease their price for larger quantities, then in the uncompressed
form they can place a QCMO bid (with q = g), which covers all the identical units. Now
the q vertices in V1 of the QCMO bid are identical, in addition to the object vertices in V2.
In the compressed form such a QCMO bid would have one vertex each in V1 and V2. These
vertices will need to be expanded out later along with some of their edges, but many of the
edges will be lost after the compression/expansion procedure. If bidders bid subadditively
(or superadditively, although this is unlikely for identical units) over the multiple units (e.g.
buy more, pay less per unit), then we need to expand out the individual units in V2; we
can represent each unit by a vertex, ordered vertically on the right, and for each bid add its
edges starting at the top and moving downward. When all bids are added in this way, any
identical vertices can be compressed; most units towards the bottom should have identical
edge connections (representing the bids that did not diﬀerentiate their price over multiple
units).
To understand the compression: consider a graph and its minimum weight cover C, if
we take any vertex v in a graph G (with cover C(v)) and duplicate it (and all of its incident
edges), then the minimum weight cover of the new graph including the duplicate must assign
an identical cover C(v) to the new vertex and will otherwise be identical. The compression
procedure computes the minimum weight cover (the matching algorithms compute the cover
anyway) of the compressed graph, and then expands all compressed units to their original
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number of vertices. Note that any edges which are not in any maximum weight matching8
compressed graph can be deleted, as they will not appear in the maximum weight matching
of the uncompressed graph either. Since we have computed the cover, this means we delete
any edge e = {u,v} for which C(u) + C(v) > w(e). What is happening here is that in the
compressed graph the algorithm can already decide which edges are deﬁnitely bad and will
not appear in the ﬁnal matching of the uncompressed graph. Finally the maximum weight
matching of the uncompressed graph is recovered by transforming the cover to a matching in
O(
√
V E) time. This is a simple matter of duplicating the graph and connecting uncovered
vertices by zero weight edges; a maximum cardinality matching is then calculated on this
graph (see Procedure Recover-Max-Matching in Kao et al. (2001); their paper works with
bipartite graphs, but this particular procedure is also correct in general). Intuitively one
can view the computation with the compressed graph as ﬁrst deciding which bids are good
and might be accepted (positive cover on their vertices) and deciding which bids should
deﬁnitely be rejected (zero cover on their vertices); in its second (recover) phase it decides
which of these good bids should actually be accepted, based on the number of units available.
To get an idea of the eﬃciency this brings consider the bipartite auction of Theorem 20
which has time complexity O(
√
m + bs bs2 log(N(m + bs))). We will just focus on the
multiple units issue. Suppose that the m objects consist of j types of object, with k units
of each (m = jk). Further suppose that bidders do not decrease their price oﬀers if buying
multiple units and that each bid is for g units of an object. Thus we have jk vertices in
V2 and bg vertices in V1. Each of the bg vertices in V1 has k edges (one to each unit of
the object it is interested in), giving a total of bgk edges. We have uncompressed time
complexity O(
√
jk + bg bgklog(N(jk + bg))). The compressed graph has j+b vertices and
b edges. The total complexity for calculating the minimum weight cover of the compressed
graph is O(
√
j + b blog(N(j + b))). after this we delete edges e = {u,v} for which C(u) +
C(v) > w(e), in linear time. Now when we expand this graph we get back a maximum of
bgk edges (we may lose some, but this depends on edge weights and we will not go into
this level of detail). The complexity for recovering the maximum weight matching will
be O(
√
jk + bg bgk), and this dominates the time taken to calculate the cover. In total
then we have lost the log term when we use the unweighted matching algorithm for the
uncompressed graph. The bgk term is still the dominant part. Note that bs2 in Theorem 20
corresponds to bgk in our example because s2 was just an upper bound for the more precise
gk in our example. Finally, we note that the s2 in the original complexity is a bottleneck
that will not go away, especially if bidders place large n-tuple bids with diﬀerent prices
across objects; the computation of the optimal allocation will take quadratic time, even if
some of those objects are identical.
Tennenholtz (2000) describes a dynamic programming approach to the multi-unit auc-
tion problem, however it requires a rather large graph to be constructed (its size is ex-
ponential in the number of types of object for sale). Tennenholtz (2002) suggests using
b-matching, making the object vertices have a b-value corresponding to the number of units
of that object for sale. This is not as eﬃcient as the above approach, as the weighted
matching algorithm itself would have to make the decisions about how many to allocate,
rather then just deciding which is a good bid (as above).
8. A maximum weight matching is not necessarily unique; if there are many possible matchings, then we
can only delete those edges which do not appear in any.
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6. Related Work
Rothkopf et al. (1998) seems to have been the ﬁrst work to relate the CAP to graph
matching; however it seems that Tennenholtz’s idea to use b-matching was independently
developed because he only mentions Rothkopf et al. brieﬂy and does not discuss their
matching approach. Rothkopf et al.’s matching approach is rather diﬀerent to Tennenholtz’s
(and ours). They consider the case where bundles are of size ≤ 2. Their graph does not
represent all the bids of bidders, but only the maximal bid on each bundle. Therefore
there is a preselection where all bids which are dominated (by a bid on the same bundle)
are discarded. Bidders are not represented in their graph, but objects are. There is an
edge between two objects if a binary bid has been placed on them (its weight will be the
maximum bid on that bundle). For singleton bids there is one extra vertex per object, with
an edge between, to represent the maximal singleton bid on that object. This formulation
means that a bidder can be allocated all the objects he bids on; it is not possible for a
bidder to express a quantity restriction on how many objects he is willing to buy. Another
limitation is that a bidder cannot place a subadditive bid; i.e. a bidder cannot express “I
will pay p1 for this and p2 for that, but only p1 +p2 −disc for both”; the auctioneer would
simply match the singleton bids because they are worth more. In other words Rothkopf
et al.’s language only allows OR, not XOR. Rothkopf et al. give an O(m3) bound for solving
the problem, where m is the number of objects; this assumes that a bid has been placed
on every possible pair and every singleton. This time bound can actually be improved to
O(
p
α(m2,m)logm m2.5 log(mN)) using Gabow and Tarjan’s (1991) algorithm. To see this
use the graph matching bound O(
p
V α(E,V )logV E log(V N)) and note that |V | = 2n
and |E| = m2 + m. In practice placing a bid on every possible pair is unrealistic in large
auctions, because there are m(m + 1)/2 ≈ m2 pairs; if only n bids are placed on pairs
we have instead the bound O(
p
mα(n,m)logm nlog(mN)) which takes into account the
possible sparseness of the bids. To compare with our approach, we can model the same
scenario with our superadditive bids on binary bundles (see Figure 10), hence our graph
will have 2n edges more than Rothkopf et al.’s, but is otherwise identical.
Rothkopf et al. (1998) also describe a number of other special cases of the CAP which
are tractable, one of these is the case of linear goods: this means the goods are ordered,
and bids can only be placed on a contiguous sequence; this makes sense when bidding for
parts of a coastline (for example), or for some time interval during which a resource can
be used. Rothkopf et al. (1998) however show that extending from goods ordered along
one dimension to rectangles in 2D space makes the problem NP-hard. Tennenholtz (2002)
has tackled the linear goods case with graph matching; we did not address this as we have
nothing to add.
Nisan (2000) has a quite comprehensive work on the relation between linear program-
ming (LP) and the CAP. By looking at the relaxation of the integer programming formu-
lation of the CAP, Nisan (2000) notes how the solution would be straightforward if objects
could be divided, so that a bidder could get 2/3 of an object for example (which could make
sense for raw materials, like oil, or for bandwidth). Interestingly, Nisan concludes that “the
main diﬃculty does not come from the eﬀects of substitutabilities or complementarities
...the diﬃculty lies in the indivisibility of the goods which is what can not be handled
well”. In contrast from our graph matching perspective our conclusion is that the diﬃculty
47Guerin
comes very much from the complementarities (superadditivity). However when we say that
matching techniques can handle substitutabilities (subadditivity) we must remember that
we are not talking about the full CAP; we have seen that we can really only handle the
special case of symmetric subadditivity.
Nisan (2000) also identiﬁes classes of auctions where the LP solution will give integer
results. This covers some of Tennenholtz’s (2000) classes, such as linear goods, and some
of Rothkopf et al.’s (1998) classes, such as hierarchical bids (which Rothkopf et al. call
nested structures). Also included are: an OR-of-XORs of singleton bids, which corresponds
to QCMO bids (see Section 3.1) when q = 1; downward sloping symmetric9 bids, which are
a special case of our subadditive symmetric n-tuple bids (see Theorem 10), where singleton
prices are identical; auctions over a set of objects S which are the sum of two auctions
(which have integral solutions) over disjoint subsets Q and R (Q ∪ R = S).
More results in this area are given by de Vries and Vohra (2003); their work gives a good
overview of methods used to tackle the CAP; these include tractable instances, exact but
exponential methods, approximate methods, market mechanisms, and more. They note
that the typical formulations of the CAP (allowing XORs via dummy goods, or directly
encoding XORs) are an instance of the set packing problem (SPP), a well studied problem
(Balas & Padberg, 1976)10. In terms of identifying solvable instances of the SPP, they cover
much of the same ground as Rothkopf et al. (1998), and much more, but from an integer
linear programming perspective. De Vries and Vohra (2003) formulate the SPP as follows.
M is the set of objects for sale. V is the set of subsets for which prices have been oﬀered.
A is a matrix where each row corresponds to an object and each column corresponds to
a member of V . The entries in A are ai,j (i = row, j = column) where ai,j = 1 if object
i ∈ M appears in subset j ∈ V , and ai,j = 0 otherwise. The optimisation problem is to
ﬁnd a vector x of ones and zeros, which selects members of V or rejects them (select=one,
reject=zero), and which maximises the total value of the selected members, subject to the
constraint that no object appears in more than one member (recall that each member of
V is a subset of the objects). De Vries and Vohra (2003) then identify constraints on the
A matrix which guarantee that the SPP has an interpretation as an easy graph matching
problem. The ﬁrst case identiﬁed is when each column of A has at most two ones. This
then corresponds to the graph matching case identiﬁed by Rothkopf et al. (1998), discussed
above. De Vries and Vohra (2003) state that “Instances of SPP where each column has at
most K ≥ 3 non-zero entries are NP-hard” this is a little ambiguous, but it is clear that
they mean “some instances of SPP...”, because in restricting each column to two ones
they are aiming to provide a condition which is suﬃcient to guarantee tractability, but not
necessary. We have seen that we can handle many instances which do have multiple ones
9. Note their deﬁnition of symmetric means that the valuation on a subset relates only to its size, and not
the singleton valuations on the objects.
10. Balas and Padberg (1976) formulate set packing as a special case of set partitioning. We must be wary
of terminological confusion here again: for the set packing and set partitioning problems, Balas and
Padberg (1976) use the acronyms SP and SPP respectively, while de Vries and Vohra (2003) use SPP
and SPA respectively.
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per column. For example, the triple bid of Figure 6 corresponds to the following A matrix:
o1
o2
o3
"
{o1,o2,o3} {o1,o2} {o2,o3} {o1,o3} {o1} {o2} {o3}
1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
#
De Vries and Vohra (2003) also state that “Instances of SPP with at most two non-zero
entries per row of A are NP-hard”, which we would again reﬁne with some.
Sandholm (2002) also outlines a number of special cases which admit polynomial solu-
tions, but these come from the related work which we have described above. None of the
above related works cover our generic n-tuples; it would appear that our n-tuples are a class
of tractable auctions that has not yet been identiﬁed. In terms of the SPP’s A and V , we
have relaxed the conditions which are suﬃcient to guarantee tractability. We cannot come
up with any condition on A which is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure a graph matching
solution, because our constraints also relate to the values in V .
Another research area, within combinatorial auctions in AI, involves algorithms which
ﬁnd exact solutions for the full CAP. Such algorithms are obviously exponential in the
worst case (since the problem is NP-hard), but clever algorithms can solve many common
instances quickly. For example Sandholm, Sandholm and Suri (2002, 2003) use a great
range of tricks to ﬁnd an optimal allocation quickly. One of the ideas of Sandholm (2002)
is to capitalise on the sparseness of bids (unlike dynamic programming approaches), which
happens automatically with our matching approach; sparse bidding results in a graph with
a small number of edges E, and E is by far the greatest contributor to the computational
complexity. A further trick employed by Sandholm and Suri (2003) is to recognise tractable
special cases (including many of those described above) and exploit them. These cases could
arise at subnodes during the search for an optimal allocation. This is a possible role for the
tractable instances we have identiﬁed; they could be incorporated in a general CAP solver.
With this it would be possible to handle all or nothing bids; the search algorithm could run
graph matching for a subset of the objects, and compare the result with what all or nothing
bids are oﬀering for that bundle. One attraction of using graph matching algorithms is that
these algorithms are extremely eﬃcient, given that they have been improved on several
times over the last ﬁfty years; therefore if we can use these to solve some special cases, we
know that we are using some of the most highly developed techniques for solving tractable
problems.
To gain advantage by incorporating graph matching techniques in a general solver
would require techniques that can quickly identify, from a set of bids, if they are solv-
able by graph matching. Clearly this is easy if bids are submitted in the form of our
(o1,p1,...,on,pn,δ2,...,δn) tuple representation (we simply scan through the deltas check-
ing our constraints), but if bids are submitted in other languages it seems that our cases
could require exponentially long bids. Nisan (2000) discusses bidding languages, such as
XOR-of-ORs, OR-of-XORs and OR*. As we stated previously, our n-tuples represent an
XOR over their subsets, and a number of such bids means an OR-of-XORs. However, no
bidding language will be as concise as our (o1,p1,...,on,pn,δ2,...,δn) tuple representation,
and the above languages will in general need an exponential expansion to represent our n-
tuples. This is because our tuples allow unique prices for singletons, and hence it is most
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likely that each possible subset of size k in the bid will have a unique price (this happens
when the sum of each subset is unique). In contrast, Nisan’s downward sloping symmetric
bids have an identical value for each subset of size k; this is what allows him to represent
it in the OR-of-XOR language in size n2. The above languages are unable to exploit the
redundancy due to symmetry in our n-tuple bids. On the other hand we could consider our
n-tuples as a new bidding language, which gives a concise representation for our bid types;
a general purpose solver might be conﬁgured to accept such bids directly.
Future directions for this work could include looking at tractable instances of weighted
set packing to see what classes of auctions they would make tractable. It is interesting to
note that while the relatively straightforward unweighted set packing problem is already
NP-hard for sets of size 3, the weighted case is much more diﬃcult than the unweighted case.
Anshelevich and Karagiozova (2007) address the equivalent problem of ﬁnding matchings in
a hypergraph and state that “The weighted case is signiﬁcantly more complicated, however,
and cannot be solved by any simple extension of the unweighted algorithm.” (weighted
hypergraph matching is the weighted set packing problem, SPP).
7. Conclusion
We have seen what types of auctions graph matching can solve, and what types it can-
not. We have also seen that those that can be handled can be solved quite quickly. In
the subadditive auctions we saw that we can handle most reasonable cases of symmetric
discounts over subsets of a bundle. In the asymmetric case matching was quite limited, but
it must be noted that our type of symmetry is a type of redundancy. Bids must have some
redundancy if they are not to be exponential in the size of the bundle on which the bid is
placed. Completely incompressible bids would be exponential in the size of the bundle, and
would be impractical both for the bidders to formulate and send and for the auctioneer to
solve. Therefore we can expect some kind of redundancy, and our symmetric bids do seem
to capture useful classes of auctions, as they respect the singleton prices and oﬀer discounts
on top of these. In conclusion we can say that matching handles subadditivity pretty well.
For the superadditive case we could really only handle pairs properly. Even seemingly
straightforward “all or nothing” bids for bundles larger than two cannot be handled (and
are NP-hard). Ultimately, to gain advantage from the beneﬁts of graph matching, and
to overcome its weaknesses, the graph matching approach could be combined with more
general CAP solvers, such as Sandholm and Suri’s (2003).
Another role of this work could be to provide researchers in the area with valuable knowl-
edge of the types of auction that graph matching approach are good for, and how proposed
auctions might be constrained so as to be eﬃciently solvable by matching techniques. For
example, Kothari, Parkes, and Suri (2005) describe auctions where bidders have decreasing
valuations such as: the bidder oﬀers $10 per unit for quantity in the range [5,9], $8 per unit
in the range [10,19], $7 in the range [20,25] and zero for any other quantity. This is NP-hard
because of the all or nothing nature of the bid for 5 units; i.e. it oﬀers $50 for 5 units, but
nothing for 4 units. If a number of bidders make such all or nothing oﬀers we have to solve
a weighted set packing problem. There are several ways to make it tractable however; for
example, make the bidder oﬀer $10 per unit for quantity in the range [1,4]. This has the
disadvantage that the auctioneer might sell small quantities to everyone. If it is generally
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the case that tiny quantities are worthless, then it will make sense to chunk the units into
ﬁves, and make the bidder oﬀer $50 for the ﬁrst chunk. Bidders then lose the ability to
buy quantities which are indivisible by 5, however we could get around this by having two
auctions, say in sequence; bulk buyers participate in the ﬁrst one, and the leftover units
are sold as singletons in the second. These alternatives seem to be a small compromise to
achieve tractability. It is interesting to note that it is only the all or nothing nature of the
ﬁrst oﬀer that makes the auction NP-hard, the bidder’s decreasing cost function poses no
problem. This shows how valuable it is to have detailed knowledge of the constraints that
can make auctions tractable; in many scenarios it may be practical to make a small tweak
to bring enormous eﬃciency beneﬁts.
We conclude with a point made by Cormen et al. (2001): algorithms are a technology.
To employ graph matching algorithms to compute optimal allocations for new classes of
auctions is to introduce a new technology, which can bring eﬃciency gains (in markets for
example).
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